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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1689

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13 July 1982

**USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS**

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW OF BOOK: "FROM WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE"

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 82 (signed to press 18 Feb 82) pp 89-92

[Review of book "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [From Whence the Threat to Peace], author not given, Voenizdat, 1982, 80 pages]

[Text] "I see a fuel dump, an airfield...."

These words of a pilot who is piloting a fighter with the identification sign of the Soviet Air Force sounds in Russian. The airplane, having broken through the NATO air defense system in West Germany, is preparing to strike military objectives.

Then the crossing of the borders of the Balkan countries by Soviet troops and the deployment of Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean Sea are shown on the screen; a 20-fold air superiority of the USSR is reported in panic. In a close-up--victims of "bombing and chemical attacks...."

This film was shown by the BBC television company which reflects the official point of view of Great Britain's government circles. The purpose of the film is to try to convince the population concerning the myth of a "Soviet military threat."

In the United States, the ABC television company went even farther than its colleagues from the banks of the Thames, releasing to the television screens an entire series of "documentary" films in the manner of photos but which are provocative in their essence under the general title "Future Wars." In order to impress on the Americans the necessity to pay from their pockets for new expensive armament programs put forth by the Washington administration, "experts" of all possible types are frightening public opinion with cock-and-bull stories about the "preparation of the Soviets for war" and amaze it with statistical calculations which have been fabricated in the CIA, trying to give to their inventions at least some appearance of plausibility.

We can also continue even further the list of ungainly procedures and methods with the aid of which they fan the lie about a "Soviet threat" and concoctions about the apparent "dangerous lagging" of the United States and NATO militarily behind the USSR. The policy of the Soviet Union and measures which it has undertaken to strengthen its defensive capability are discussed at random. Such misinformation, noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, is carried throughout the world as if on command by telegraph agencies, the press, radio, and television.

The myth of the "Red danger" is old--it is as old as our state and our Armed Forces. For many years, the anti-Soviets of all colors became skilled at their trade, but the propagandizing of this hackneyed myth has not known such a scope as now. The fact that the unprecedented splash of anti-Soviet hysteria is coming namely in our time is caused by a number of circumstances connected with the general situation in the world and with the foreign policy course of the United States and a number of other countries of the North Atlantic bloc.

"The sphere of imperialist dominance in the world has narrowed..." it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress. "The aggressiveness of imperialism's policy, and first of all, of American policy, has increased sharply." A sharp turn occurred in the policy of Washington and its allies at the end of the 1970's. Counting on the use of force in international relations and on untwisting the handwheel of the arms race has again been openly accomplished. Such a policy pursues the goals of restoring the positions lost by American imperialism and winning world domination. And the military-policy lines of the White House cannot be considered as anything but a program of comprehensive preparations for war.

To justify such a course, highly-placed representatives of the White House and the Pentagon also brandish with even greater zeal the anti-Soviet incense which sheds the fumes of slander on our country and the Soviet Armed Forces. This is also served by the pamphlet, "Soviet Military Power," prepared by the U. S. Department of Defense. Frightening the readers with descriptions of our military equipment, the Pentagon at the same time remains absolutely quiet about the colossal armaments of the United States and NATO. By itself, isn't this already an attempt to mislead the people, the striving to camouflage the giant scales of the military preparations of the United States and its allies in aggressive blocs? And is it possible to give the reader an idea of the strategic situation in the world without presenting any comparative data on the American armed forces?

The book, "From Whence the Threat to Peace," which was prepared by competent Soviet organs and published recently by the Military Publishing House of the Soviet Ministry of Defense exposes convincingly the unscrupulous methods of the Pentagon and shows by using facts who is guilty in the arms race. Along with data of authoritative Soviet instances, it also presents some numerical and factual materials of the London Institute of Strategic Studies and official American sources. This permits world public opinion to judge impartially the general direction of the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union and the United States and provides the opportunity to compare quantitative information presented in the publication and thus to draw objective conclusions concerning the actual correlation of forces and weapons between the two sides.

Who began the arms race and, first of all, in weapons of mass destruction and has continued it on ever increasing scales for more than three decades? Who is increasing its military power without restraint and creating an actual threat to the peace and security of peoples? The book gives well-reasoned answers to these questions. In it, it is recalled that the appearance of the most destructive weapon in the history of mankind became known in August 1945. Creating the atomic bomb, the United States employed it against the peaceful populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki without any military necessity.

In the 1950's, initiating a sensation about an imaginary "bomber gap," the U.S. Department of Defense obtained big appropriations for the building of strategic bombers. And so an entire armada of such aircraft became operational. Only then was it learned that from the very beginning the number of Soviet bombers was exaggerated three- or four-fold.

Take Washington's propaganda campaign of the 1960's in connection with the "missile gap." The authors of the book recall that in this case, too, it was across the ocean that they first began the mass deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. More than 1,000 such missiles were deployed. And what happened? Just as in the preceding case, "it turned out" that Soviet missile power was exaggerated 15- 20-fold by the west.

Then, at the beginning of the 1960's the American program for the construction of 41 nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles was worked out. But you see, at that time no one in the world as yet had such submarines, consequently neither was there a "threat."

A new turn of the arms race began at the beginning of the 1970's. Its initiator, the authors stress, was once again the United States which was the first to equip its strategic ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Right after this, across the ocean they began the creation of a new type of strategic weapon--long-range cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. The book presents information that the United States is accumulating and improving chemical weapons and implementing a program for the development of biological and psychochemical means for the waging of war.

And finally, in 1981 the head of the White House made the decision for full-scale production of a new type of barbarous weapon, the neutron weapon, and he put forth a "comprehensive" program of militaristic preparations. It is frankly aimed at the attainment not simply of military, but of "strategic" superiority over the Soviet Union and envisages the accelerated build-up of all three components of U.S. strategic forces: strategic bombers with nuclear missiles on board, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, as well as other measures. Thus, putting forth a new program, the American administration intentionally proceeded even farther toward a confrontation with the USSR and the intensification of international tension as a whole.

Thus, who challenged whom?--the authors of the book correctly ask. Who is imposing the arms race on the world?

Facing increased military danger the Soviet Union, of course, could not and cannot remain indifferent toward plans which threaten the peace and was forced to undertake responsive measures. The position of principle in this question was set forth by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in responding to the journal DER SPIEGEL. He said that it would be better to abandon dreams of attaining military superiority over the USSR. But if necessary, the Soviet people will find the possibilities to undertake any additional efforts and do everything necessary to ensure the reliable defense of their country. The Soviet Union itself, however, never was the initiator of the arms race. This is graphically obvious from the comparative table presented in the first section of the book, "From Whence the Threat to Peace."

In the press, the Pentagon is juggling figures in every possible way about Soviet missiles, using them to frighten the poorly informed part of the population. But you see, the logic of honest polemics also requires the talking about the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. But not one word of this across the ocean.

These data are presented in the work of the Soviet researchers, "From Whence the Threat to Peace." Strategic offensive forces comprise the basis of the U.S. military power and nuclear potential. They include intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic aviation, and nuclear missile submarines. It is the so-called American strategic triad. The book reports that the U.S. strategic offensive forces number 2,112 nuclear-weapons carriers including 1,053 intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, 411 bombers, and 648 ballistic missile launchers on 40 nuclear missile submarines. More than half the nuclear submarines, the authors inform us, are constantly on combat patrol in regions which ensure launching of nuclear strikes from different directions against objectives located deep in the territory of the USSR.

Nor can it be forgotten that the Soviet Union is opposed not only by the United States, but also by two other nuclear powers of the West, and the threat from Chinese nuclear forces is more serious for the USSR than for the United States.

To frighten world public opinion, the Pentagon also refers to the Soviet Navy and to its expanded capabilities to accomplish missions in distant regions of the world, in which a "challenge to the West's traditional dominance at sea" is seen. In this regard, across the ocean they refer to the appearance of the aircraft carriers "Kiev" and "Minsk" and the "Kirov" nuclear missile cruiser in the Soviet Navy.

From the book by the Soviet authors, the reader learns that the American Navy includes 20 rather than 2 aircraft carriers and 9 rather than 1 nuclear missile cruisers. When, in the 1960's-1970's the Soviet Union created atomic icebreakers for the peaceful mastery of the Arctic, the United States built seven of the biggest aircraft carriers in the world one after another. The displacement of each of them is 80,000-90,000 tons and they each carry 90 airplanes on board.

A one-sided, far from objective approach is also traced in the evaluation of the armaments of Soviet Ground Forces and our country's defense industry by Pentagon "experts." The military expenditures of the USSR are systematically exaggerated and they keep silent about the fact that they have remained virtually constant in recent years.

And what, in fact, are the military expenditures of the United States? It is stressed in the book that this country's military budget is growing from year to year. The pages of the publication under review present official American data in this regard. Thus, the rates of growth in the military budget of the United States in the 1970's-1980's were more than 13 percent. And in 1981 it had already increased by 19 percent. Even higher military expenditures of the United States and NATO are envisaged for subsequent years. In 1985 Washington, in particular, plans appropriations for military purposes exceeding 340 billion dollars. And for the next five-year period as a whole--1.5 trillion dollars.

The fabrications of the U.S. Defense Department about the "global spreading of Soviet military power" which allegedly is taking place are explained in the book in a well-reasoned manner. The absurdity of this assertion is so obvious that the Pentagon was forced to admit an indisputable fact: Soviet military contingents are located on the territory of only some allied states of Eastern Europe and adjacent countries--Mongolia and Afghanistan. In which regard, they are there on strictly treaty bases.

And what about U.S. forces? American units and large units are disposed in dozens of countries at more than 1,500 military bases and installations. They are located primarily close to the borders of the Soviet Union, stress the authors of the book. Aircraft carriers with carriers of nuclear weapons, nuclear missile submarines, and detachments of surface warships of the U.S. Navy ply continuously near the shores of Europe, the Far East, and in the Indian Ocean. The gendarme fist of the Pentagon--the more than 200,000-man Rapid Deployment Force--is in readiness for transfer over thousands of kilometers from the United States.

The book, "From Whence the Threat to Peace," discloses the groundlessness of the Pentagon's treatment of questions on Soviet deliveries of weapons to developing countries. "Specialists" from the Pentagon are trying to depict the USSR as the biggest exporter of military equipment and armaments. The facts draw an absolutely different picture: about 45 percent of the world trade in arms is the share of the United States. And more than 20 percent of this trade belongs to other countries of the North Atlantic bloc. Then from where, the question arises, does the main flow of weapons reach the world market? It is generally known that the weapons supplied by the United States and its allies are used to support reactionary dictator regimes, suppress national liberation and revolutionary movements, and to consolidate the American military presence in the countries to which they are sent.

An object of speculation in the West often consists of the basic provisions of the foreign policy line of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The "export of revolution," "subversive activity in other countries," and so forth are ascribed to the Soviet Union. The groundlessness of such concoctions is disclosed by those who prepared the book of the Military Publishing House. There was not, is not, and will not be in history one example which in the slightest could confirm the cock-and-bull story about the "Soviet export of revolution." The CPSU believes that revolution cannot be imposed on any country from the outside; it can be caused only by internal reasons and social conditions. At the same time, there are a great number of instances of the imperialist export of counterrevolution. The leading role in this after World War II belongs to the United States.

The authors of the book published in the USSR exposed in a well-reasoned manner the frauds of Western propaganda concerning the essence of Soviet military doctrine. This is of special significance in connection with the fact that across the ocean they ascribe plans for a first strike to our country. Our military doctrine bears an especially defensive character. This has been declared repeatedly by Soviet leaders. The USSR always proceeded and proceeds from the principle of responsive, that is, defensive operations. The proposition that the Soviet Union will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons forms the basis of our military strategy. We consider nuclear attack itself as the most serious crime against mankind.

In the United States, on the contrary, various military-strategic concepts which bear an undisguised aggressive character are being developed and widely publicized. In particular, the leadership of the United States is imposing on the world the idea of so-called "limited" nuclear war. But you see, such an approach leads to a lowering of the "nuclear threshold" and to the intensification of the nuclear danger as a whole.

One of the sections of the book discloses the mechanism of the U.S. war machine. The authors note that for its numbers and quantity of armaments it is superior to the armed forces of Great Britain, France, the FRG, and Italy taken together. The total strength of the U.S. Armed Forces is about three million servicemen and one million civilians. The authors of the book direct the readers' attention to the circumstance that already in peacetime the American armed forces have been operationally reduced to five formations [ob'yedineniye] and three special commands created for the direction and training of troop formations for war and for working out ahead of time plans for strategic operations in "theaters of war" in accordance with the global policy of the United States.

As is known, American military doctrine is directed at the preparation and conduct of aggressive wars on overseas territories. It is namely with consideration of this doctrine that the forces and weapons of four joint commands out of five are already deployed beyond the limits of the United States. Namely where? In Europe, on the Atlantic, on the Pacific Ocean, and in Central and South America. In which regard two of the biggest groups of American troops, it is stressed in the book, are disposed in the immediate proximity of the Soviet borders in the west and east. The U.S. general purpose forces in Europe alone number more than 336,000 men. They are equipped with the most modern offensive weapons and equipment--and the authors of the book especially call attention to this. Together with the troops of the FRG, the European grouping of the United States is the main strike force of NATO's combined armed forces which are aimed against the Soviet Union and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

All components of the U.S. Armed Forces are examined in detail in the book--strategic nuclear forces and general purpose forces. Its content logically leads the reader to the conclusion that the American war machine is, in its nature, a weapon of imperialist coercion over peoples and serves global expansionist goals.

A considerable place in the book is allotted to an analysis of the correlation of forces, including nuclear, in the world and in Europe, concerning which American propaganda disseminates so many fantasies. This analysis shows that an approximate equality exists on both sides in strategic nuclear armaments, in medium range nuclear weapons, and in non-nuclear armaments. Thus, for a number of years the number of medium range nuclear weapons of the USSR and NATO has remained approximately the same--about 1,000 on each side. This fact was especially stressed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in answering questions of the West German journal DER SPIEGEL. The United States, however, is trying to change the situation in its favor. And if 572 new American missiles are additionally placed in Europe (which Washington is achieving in an intensified manner), the West will obtain a more than one-and-a-half-fold advantage over the member countries of the Warsaw Pact for number of medium range carriers. And for number of nuclear warheads the NATO superiority will be even greater.

Apart from everything else, in case the Pentagon's dangerous plans are implemented the general strategic balance between the United States and the USSR will be disrupted since the "Euromissiles" are strategic weapons as regards the USSR. However, Washington conceals this circumstance from the European public in every possible way.

The book, "From Whence the Threat to Peace" is a worthy rebuke to those forces in the West which are frightening the peoples with the "Soviet military threat." Its content provides a specific answer to the question which is contained in the title. It is not by chance that at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists devoted to the publication of the edition being reviewed, the hope was expressed that world public opinion will be able to understand from whence the threat to peace actually comes. Unquestionably, the book will help it in this. At the same time, it is of undoubted interest not only for international and Soviet public opinion. The facts reported in it will serve as a valuable help for commanders, political officers, and organizational and ad hoc propagandists of the Armed Forces in instilling high political vigilance in the Soviet servicemen and in mobilizing them for further improvement in soldierly skill and strengthening the combat readiness of units and ships and the Armed Forces as a whole.

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ARMED FORCES

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Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 82 (signed to press 18 Feb 82) pp 1-2

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ARMED FORCES

MILITARY DISCIPLINE AS A CONSTANT PARTY TASK STRESSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 82 (signed to press 18 Feb 82) pp 3-7

[Editorial: "Party Concern for Military Discipline"]

[Text] Discipline is the basis of the Armed Forces' fighting efficiency. From the first days of our Armed Forces' organization the Communist Party has tirelessly been bringing up the Soviet servicemen in the spirit of strictest state of discipline and in the spirit of undeviating observance of the requirements of the oath and the regulations. Attaching tremendous significance to the constant raising of the combat readiness of a socialist state's Armed Forces, V. I. Lenin taught the creation of military discipline and military vigilance brought to the highest limits.

Being constantly concerned for the strengthening of military discipline under contemporary conditions, the party not only proceeds from the experience of the armed protection of the achievements of the Great October, but it also considers today's requirements. The fundamental changes in the military-technical equipping of the Armed Forces and the methods for the conduct of combat operations, the increased responsibility of the Armed Forces for the security of the Soviet state and the defense of socialism's achievements, the complicated situation in the world--all this causes the necessity for an even higher state of organization, internal self-control of the personnel, and firm order in each unit and on each ship as called for by the regulations. "Now," stresses Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "when the decisive role in military affairs belongs primarily to group types of weapons and when success in their employment depends on the skillful and coordinated actions of many people, exceptional significance is acquired by a high state of organization, constant self-control, and the irreproachable execution of each one."

This conclusion forms the basis of party-political work in the Armed Forces, one of whose main tasks consists of bringing up the motherland's armed defenders in a spirit of the conscientious accomplishment of their military duty and the undeviating observance of order as called for by the regulations. This work has become noticeably more active in the course of preparations for the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. Military councils, commanders, political organs, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations are concentrating their efforts on the unity of the military collectives, ensuring the exemplary performance of combat duty and guard and interior services, and intensifying the indoctrinal role of socialist competition. A subject of their constant concern consists of the clear

organization of combat and political training and the technically competent operation of armament, the correct mutual relationships of the servicemen, the precise accomplishment of the agenda, training plans, and programs, and a further rise in combat readiness.

Firm military order and clear organization of the training-indoctrinal process depend to a decisive degree on the one-man commander. He bears personal responsibility to the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the constant combat and mobilization readiness of the unit, ship, or subunit, military discipline, and the political and moral state of the personnel. Political organs and party organizations are called upon to strengthen the unity of command and authority of commanders in every way and to mold in them lofty political, combat-morale, and moral qualities and a sense of responsibility for strengthening organization and discipline in the subunits, units, and on the ships and for a rise in vigilance and combat readiness. It is important to develop in the officers, and especially in the young ones, the striving to treasure the honor of military rank, to arm them with leading experience in the training and indoctrination of subordinates and deep knowledge of pedagogy and psychology, and to teach the combination of demandingness with concern for people and respect for their human dignity.

At the same time, the strength and energy of the personnel should be directed most persistently toward the selfless execution of the commander's will. To display concern for this means, first of all, explaining to the men the unity of the world outlook, ideological convictions, and social interests of our officer personnel and of all servicemen and the community of their patriotic goal as armed defenders of the general Soviet state. There are many means here: lectures, talks, thematic soirees, and motion picture festivals on the skill of Soviet military leaders and outstanding military commanders in the war years and about the selfless labor of commanders in maintaining the combat readiness of units, ships, and subunits in peacetime. These and other well organized measures and skillful individual work will help to mold love and respect for their commander in the men and will develop in them the realized striving for obedience and unconditional accomplishment of orders and instructions.

An indispensable condition for firm discipline in any military collective is the clear organization of service. A person will always be self-collected, smart-looking, and ready for actions only in the case where he is placed under conditions of genuine military order. Commanders, political organs, and party organizations see their loyal ally in the exemplary tenor of life of the personnel and are constantly concerned about the observance of the rules for interior service. This is especially important for staffs as well as for staff party organizations. It is a matter of honor of their communists to accomplish the effective monitoring of the accomplishment of the regulations, manuals, orders, and instructions which ensure the continuous rhythm of combat training and irreproachable order, to display objectivity and devotion to principle in work, to eradicate persistently instances of an irresponsible, negligent attitude toward service duties, and to render more active assistance to commanders in firmly establishing firm order as required by the regulations. All this is the correct guarantee of lofty achievements in combat and political training.

It is known that military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces is based on the high political consciousness of the servicemen, their deep understanding of their

patriotic duty and the international tasks of our people, and on their boundless devotion to their socialist motherland, the Communist Party, and the Soviet government. All this offers broad possibilities for Armed Forces party organizations for the indoctrination of the personnel in a spirit of ideological conviction and a high state of organization. Using brilliant and convincing examples from the history of our party, the socialist state, and the Soviet Armed Forces and instances of soldierly valor of the present generation of the fatherland's defenders, they are called upon to disclose the moral-political essence of Soviet military discipline as the most important condition for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, to propagandize the Lenin behests for the armed defenders of our motherland, the requirements of the CPSU to maintain the combat readiness of the troops, and the provisions of the military oath and general troop regulations, and to step forth as active assistants to the commanders in cultivating firm order as called for by the regulations in units, on ships, and in subunits. These tasks are accomplished more successfully in those units and on those ships where combat and political training is well organized, an integrated approach to the organization of the entire matter of indoctrinating the servicemen is implemented, and where their life, living conditions, and leisure take place in exact conformance with the requirements of the military regulations. The wealth of experience of the Armed Forces convinces us of this.

Last year, the personnel of the regiment where one of the party committee members is Major A. Yakovlev successfully accomplished training combat missions and won the title of excellent. In the present training year, the course in the unit is continuing toward a further rise in the quality and effectiveness of the training process and the unconditional accomplishment of training plans, programs, and socialist obligations. This is furthered primarily by the high discipline of the personnel. Using varied forms of political-indoctrinal work the commander, political officer, and party and Komsomol organizations help the personnel to understand the political essence and practical significance of military discipline for the maintenance of constant combat readiness. The communists exert their influence on their associates by tested means--party word and personal example. Here all party members and candidates are rated specialists and 71 percent are experts. Their fellow servicemen are their equal; more than half of them are also experts and highly disciplined men. The party organization also devotes constant attention to improving the domestic and cultural living conditions of the personnel. Demandingness as called for by the regulations and concern for the needs of people as well as the satisfaction of their demands make the efforts of commanders, political officers, and all communists more effective in strengthening military discipline.

But can it be said that this is the situation in all our party collectives? Unfortunately, no. There still are cases where they put up with instances of an irresponsible attitude of individual servicemen toward their duties, failure to accomplish the requirements of general military regulations, and unworthy behavior in public places and with the fact that some communists, including officers, have poor knowledge of the attitude and requirements of people and life in the barracks and do not devote proper attention to the solidarity of the troop collectives. Experienced commanders and political officers at times poorly teach young officers, warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], petty officers, and sergeants the ability to lean upon the party and Komsomol activists, do not always analyze their activity, do not note the zeal of some, and do not condemn the carelessness of others.

Many of these shortcomings, for example, are observed in the Nth unit. Lieutenant Colonel D. Sokolov and other communists spoke of them at a party election meeting. They explained the drop in indices in combat and political training and in the level of organization and order primarily by shortcomings in political indoctrinal work and by its weakening directly in the subunits, there where the success of the entire matter is resolved. It was noted that sometimes they recall the necessity to strengthen discipline here only after some incident occurs. And really, the demands on those guilty of a breakdown in discipline, including communists, were not always strict. They rarely appeared as defendants before the party collective. Therefore, not all party members and candidates serve as examples in behavior and the performance of their duty.

Meanwhile, party concern for discipline presumes first of all an increase in the responsibility of communists, especially officers, for the state of affairs in the military collective, the undeviating accomplishment of requirements set forth by the regulations, and the maintenance of organization and order. Organization, efficiency, and discipline, it was noted at the November (1981) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, are necessary requirements for party, state, and economic organs in the center as well as locally. And they proceed correctly in those party organizations where they constantly increase the demands on communists for the maintenance of order as called for by the regulations, persistently introduce the experience of those who seek ways for the further strengthening of discipline searchingly and with initiative, and see that an honest, conscientious attitude toward military duty becomes the personal conviction and standard of behavior of all servicemen.

The communists are called upon to go in the vanguard of the struggle for firm discipline. V. I. Lenin said that the party member should move ahead of all in discipline and energy. And this is exactly how the servicemen-communists proceed in daily life. Being on the decisive sectors of the struggle for the combat readiness of the units, ships, and subunits they step forth as the main support of commanders in the maintenance of exemplary order as called for by the regulations and accomplish their military duty with a sense of lofty responsibility. But it would be incorrect to close the eyes to the fact that we still have party members and candidates who do not provide a personal example in the observance of the requirements of Soviet laws, regulations, and standards of communist morals. Even if they are individuals, we cannot put up with such a situation. Does the communist, including the leader, step forth as the champion of discipline, what is his influence on others while on service as well as out of it, what does he do to prevent any delinquencies? These questions deserve the constant attention of party organizations. A talk about them which is based on principle should take place at meetings and sessions of party committees and party bureaus and in the course of listening to the reports of communists, of an exacting evaluation of their personal contribution to the common success, and of individual talks with them.

The strengthening of party influence on all aspects of the life and activity of the Armed Forces and on the state of discipline was and remains one of the firm bases of Soviet military organizational development. "The primary party organizations and party groups," it says in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political indoctrinal work," "should be centers of daily ideological indoctrinal activity, rally the collective, skillfully conduct individual work with people, stimulate their social and labor activity, and

raise their work style and way of life....". To accomplish persistently the broad scientifically substantiated program for further improvement of ideological and political indoctrinational work put forth by the 26th CPSU Congress as well as by the decree of the party's Central Committee which is being discussed means ensuring the high scientific level, efficiency, and concreteness of propaganda and agitation and its connection with indefatigable concern that the Soviet Armed Forces are a clear and coordinated organism and have a high state of organization and discipline. In implementing these requirements purposefully, party organizations are called upon to delve deeply into the content and quality of political training of all categories of servicemen, to raise the effectiveness of ideological work, to improve its forms and methods, and to ensure the active participation in it by all communists without exception.

The strong combat solidarity of the collective and the moral atmosphere in it depend to a considerable degree on how skillfully and systematically commanders, political officers, and party organizations are occupied with the political, legal, and military indoctrination of the personnel and, in so doing, use the method of the individual approach. The role of party organizations and party groups of subunits and of party members and candidates living in the barracks is especially great in such work. As a good physician knows all the human nerve centers, so are the communists who are closest of all to the soldiers and seamen called upon to make a deep study of the professional and moral qualities of the men, their attitudes, needs, and requirements, and to raise the effectiveness of indoctrinational influence on their associates. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that the individual approach is not exhausted by the striving to conduct a face-to-face talk with a person, but also presumes attention to the fellow serviceman, and assisting him in mastering combat skill, and friendly advice, and exhortation on how to proceed better in one case or another and, if necessary, severe condemnation of an unworthy act. It is the duty of the party organizations to create among the communists and all men an environment of intolerance toward deviations from the requirements of the oath and the regulations and the standards of military order and to arouse more actively the public opinion of the Armed Forces for the struggle against violations of the rules of military life and the standards of communist ethics.

Party work is living work with people. It is directed toward the development of such moral values in them as moral fiber, honor, conscience, an exacting self-evaluation of their actions, a respectful attitude toward commanders and comrades, and a keen feeling of participation with the armed defenders of the country who are responsible for its security to the highest degree. And who, first of all, should mold an inner, deeply realized requirement to accomplish his patriotic duty in a sacred manner in our men if not the political officer! In L. I. Brezhnev's book "Vospominaniya" [Recollections] there are simple and, at the same time, remarkable words: "Then I became unit political instructor. The days were filled to the limit. Military service, and the publication of operational news sheets, and the political hour, and indoctrinational work, and really it was necessary to speak with a soldier. People remain people, they all have their concerns, their troubles, and their joys." The most important thing in the deeds and aspirations of the political officer is noticed in these words--closeness to people and the ability to influence their spiritual, inner world and behavior. It has been said since olden times that if the commander is the soldier's father, the political officer is his soul. By life itself he is called upon to be the trustee of the thoughts and intentions

of each man, to be a genuine engineer of human souls, and to teach the art of convincing the broad party and Komsomol activists.

As the party election meetings which took place on the eve of the new year showed, a weakening of efforts by some party organizations as well as of individual communists in the struggle for firm military order is caused primarily by the low level of intra-party work. And from what has been said follows the conclusion that it is necessary to raise even more persistently the activity, initiative, and devotion to principle in the activity of all party collectives. The correct path to this is improving the practice of the preparation and conduct of meetings, intensifying the monitoring and checking of execution, and the development of criticism and self-criticism. Of course, the further strengthening of activity and the combat vitality of party organizations will also depend greatly on the level of their leadership on the part of the political organs. They are called upon to actively assist the party organizations of units, ships, and subunits in mastering the entire arsenal of forms and methods of organizational and mass political work which is directed toward strengthening combat readiness and military discipline. Its improvement should be furthered to the maximum by preparations for the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations.

Tireless party concern for the further strengthening of the state of organization and military order will help to raise the combat readiness of units and ships to an even higher level, to ensure the quality accomplishment of great and important tasks of the new training year and the socialist obligations which have been assumed, and to prepare a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

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ARMED FORCES

OFFICER POLITICAL TRAINING ON PARTY LEADERSHIP

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 82 (signed to press 18 Feb 82) pp 13-24

[Article by P. Rodionov, first deputy director of Institute on Marxism-Leninism with the CPSU Central Committee, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "An Important Condition for the Success of Party Leadership"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] This article is recommended for use in groups for Marxist-Leninist training when studying the subject, "The 26th CPSU Congress on improving the style and methods of party leadership and raising demandingness for the observance of Leninist standards of party life."

The deeds and thoughts of the Soviet communists are now directed toward the effective accomplishment of the tasks of party domestic and foreign policy decreed by the 26th CPSU Congress. These tasks are important and complex and require the mobilization of all forces and resources which the country and the people have available. And, naturally, especially high requirements are imposed on the level, quality, and style of work of the party itself--the political leadership of our developed socialist society.

Leadership style and methods, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the congress, is a question which is important for the entire party and for the entire people. It is the direct duty of any party leader to remember this and to be guided by Leninist standards daily and in everything! And we are speaking first of all about generating a work style in which expedition and discipline would be organically combined with bold initiative and enterprise. Practicality and efficiency--with the striving for great goals. A critical attitude toward shortcomings--with firm confidence in the historic advantages of the path which we have selected (see "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 51, 73).

Leninism is rightly called a theoretical and practical school which molds a special type of party and state figure in whom a special--Leninist--style is inherent in work. Namely V. I. Lenin, the scientist of genius, tribune-propagandist, and organizer of the broad popular masses, not only substantiated the historic goals and tasks of the party comprehensively and deeply, but he also worked out those standards of party life and that style of party work which ensure the success of the revolutionary struggle and communist creation.

A profound scientific character in the analysis of events which are occurring, a sober consideration of the correlation and disposition of class forces, consistency and firmness in upholding Marxist principles, purposefulness in actions, flexibility in the tactics of struggle, selfless service for the interests of the workers, and the great ideals of communism, respect for people, responsiveness, fairness—all these distinguishing features and personal qualities of V. I. Lenin became the law of party life and placed an indelible impression on the style and methods of its leading activity.

The Lenin style is the richest property of our party. As a category of party construction, it is the totality of stable, typical peculiarities and features of party activity which are based on the firm principles of the Lenin teaching of the party as the leading and directing force of the working class in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism and communism and on the Lenin standards of party life and principles and methods of party leadership. The essence of the Lenin style is made up of: the unity of theory and practice and of political and organizational activity and a scientific approach in party work and leadership; ideological conviction and party devotion to principle; revolutionary scope and high efficiency, initiative, and socialist enterprise; collectiveness in combination with personal responsibility for the assigned matter; a critical approach to a matter and intolerance toward shortcomings; and ties with the masses and concern for people.

The practice of socialist and communist construction in the USSR confirmed brilliantly the vitality and rationality of the forms, methods, and style of party work substantiated by V. I. Lenin. At the same time, the necessity for their constant improvement was also confirmed. This is proper because the party's role in the life of society is steadily increasing and the scales and complexity of the tasks which it is accomplishing are increasing. Being a spiritual factor in itself, the Lenin style possesses tremendous material force. The scope, quality, and effectiveness of the activity of each party, state, and administrative organ, of each party organization, and of each labor and military collective depend on the strict accomplishment of all its requirements. And this, in the final analysis, is embodied in the growth in the might and wealth of our country, in the strengthening of its defensive capability, and in a rise in the popular well-being.

The Leninist party staff--the Central Committee--demonstrates examples of a truly Leninist style of work and leadership. It persistently conducts the line for the confirmation of Lenin principles and standards of party life and for the introduction of the Lenin style in all spheres of activity. A tremendous role in this regard was and continues to be played by the decisions of the October (1964) Central Committee plenum, the 23d, 24th, 25th, and 26th Party Congresses, and by the statements and works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and his remarkable books "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Renaissance], "Tselina" [Virgin Land], and "Vospominaniya" [Recollections] in which the author's richest personal experience is organically combined with our deeds of today.

In following the example and being guided by the lines of the CPSU Central Committee, local party organizations are constantly improving their work style and methods. Their activity is characterized ever more and more by efficiency, self-collection, a creative approach to the solution of the difficult problems of socio-political

life, increased demandingness toward cadres and toward all communists, and intensifying organizational and ideological indoctrinational work. The accountability report of the Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress noted the energetic, initiative work of many republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon party organizations which stepped forth with valuable initiatives and achieved good results in the development of creative activity of production collectives and in the communist indoctrination of the workers. It was stressed that the richer and more varied the local experience, the more fruitful the party activity as a whole.

Activity has increased noticeably and the work style of the primary party organizations has improved in recent years. Comprising the basis of our party, they are called upon to conduct the party line firmly and to stand guard over state interests resolutely and uncompromisingly.

Recommendations for the Seminar

The seminar on the subject, /"The 26th CPSU Congress on the party as the vanguard of the Soviet people and the further improvement of the methods of party leadership. Consolidation of the Lenin work style in the activity of military personnel"/ will permit the students to have a deeper understanding of the directing and organizing role of the Communist Party in the life of Soviet society at the contemporary stage of communist construction, the content and features of the Lenin style of leadership, and ways to master the Lenin science of control.

It is recommended that the following basic questions be brought up for discussion:

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the increase in the party's leading role in communist construction and in its armed defense.
2. The 26th CPSU Congress on ways to improve methods of party leadership.
3. The tasks of commanders, political organs, and party organizations in the strengthening of the Lenin work style of military personnel.
4. Criticism of bourgeois and revisionistic falsifications of the CPSU's leading role under conditions of developed socialism.

After the introductory remarks of the seminar leader, it is expedient to hear the paper, /"Leninist principles and methods of party leadership and their significance for improving the work style of military personnel."/

When considering the /first question/, it should be noted that the objective regular law of the increase in the party's role in the life of society was deeply substantiated by V. I. Lenin. He believed that the greater the scale and the more difficult tasks become on one or another stage of its activity, the broader and more actively the struggle of the masses is initiated, the deeper and more many-faceted the nature assumed by the party's theoretical, political, and organizational work, and its leading role is strengthened.

V. I. Lenin attached important significance to all party elements in the matter of raising the role and combat effectiveness of the party and strengthening its ties with the masses. In this regard, he moved up to first place the local party cells, considering them to be the basis of the party and the "strong points" of party work in the thick of the masses of the working class and of all workers. With an increase in the independent revolutionary activity of the masses, stressed V. I. Lenin, "particular significance is acquired by the role of the /party/ as the

vanguard of the class, indoctrinator, and organizer ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 9, p 406).

Our party became the ruling party after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In this connection, the 2d Comintern Congress noted: "The history of the Russian Communist Party which has been in power in the tremendous country for three years shows that the role of the Communist Party after the winning of power by the working class not only did not decrease but, on the contrary, increased extremely." Now, under conditions of developed socialism, when the building of communism has become the immediate practical task of our people, a further increase in the role and significance of the Communist Party as the leading and directing force of Soviet society is occurring.

The Lenin ideas on the basic factors which caused an increase in the role of the party in the life of our society received deep and comprehensive development in the CPSU Program, in the decisions and materials of the 23d, 24th, 25th, and 26th Party Congresses, and in the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The most important of these factors are: the growth in the scales and complexity of the tasks of communist construction which require a higher level of political and organizational leadership; a rise in the creative activity of the masses and the attraction of new millions of workers to the control of state affairs and production; the further development of socialist democracy and rise in the role of public organizations; and the increasing significance of the theory of scientific communism, the necessity for its creative development and propagandizing, intensification of the communist indoctrination of the workers, and the complete overcoming of vestiges of the past in the consciousness of people. The content and significance of these factors are examined in sufficient detail in the article by V. Bondar', "The Increase in the Role of the Party in the Period of Developed Socialism," which was published in issue No 4 of our journal for this year.

The increase in the role of the CPSU in the leadership of the Armed Forces is also caused by a number of interconnected factors. Among them are: the complexity of the processes occurring in the world arena and, hence, the unprecedentedly increased responsibility of the party for the correct analysis of the military-political situation and the adoption of timely, effective measures against aggression from wherever it may originate; intensification of the dependence of the combat power and combat readiness of the Armed Forces on the level of socio-economic and cultural development and the moral-political and spiritual potentials of the country; expansion of international tasks for the defense of socialism's achievements. The thorough disclosure of these factors on the seminar will be helped by a study of the article by member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces" (see "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'y" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 478-504).

The 26th CPSU Congress again recalled the wise Lenin thought that the essence of party leadership consists of the selection of people and checking execution. Basic attention in discussing the /second question/ should be devoted namely to the improvement of the quality composition and distribution of leader personnel, raising their qualifications, and checking the execution of decisions which have been adopted as the main direction for improving methods of party leadership.

It is necessary to understand clearly that the task of social control (control of the country in the name of creating a new social system) is main and central in the party's activity. In accomplishing it, the party does not administer and does not command, and it does not substitute for state and public organizations. Its method of action is convincing the masses and their ideological-political indoctrination and organization. The CPSU works out the general strategy for the country's development, organizes the workers for its accomplishment, selects, distributes, and indoctrinates cadres, monitors their work, and checks the execution of the decisions which have been adopted. Its activity is concentrated on ensuring that all elements of the political system of society perform their functions with complete responsibility and in the proper manner. By the force of its authority and through the communists, the party determines a single line in the varied activity of various organizations and sees that each of them increases the effectiveness and quality of work and that the political consciousness of the workers grows. This also pertains to the organs of popular authority--the Soviets, and to the apparatus for state control, and to all elements of material and spiritual production, and to mass organizations, and to creative unions--in short, to everything which comprises the most complex system, which is called society.

But the primary role in the accomplishment of the large and varied tasks of communist construction, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, belongs to the primary party organizations. Therefore, the congress' requirement consists of making the work of these local party cells as active as possible. The party's personnel policy serves as a powerful lever for raising the combat vitality of party organizations. In this connection, it is necessary to examine the reference points which were given by the 26th CPSU Congress for local party organs for a further improvement in the quality composition and the distribution of leader personnel. We are speaking primarily of raising the political training of the young leaders who come to the party apparatus from production. Also pointed out is the necessity to advance to leading party work those comrades who know from personal experience the demands and interests of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. The lines of the party congress on personnel problems are also timely under the conditions of the Armed Forces.

The requirement of the congress to ensure the undeviating accomplishment of the decisions which have been adopted in the established time pertains completely to improvement of methods of party leadership. This should be helped by intensifying the monitoring which must be accomplished systematically and effectively, from above and below simultaneously.

On the seminar, attention is merited by determining the essence of the entire organization of work in the field of control which was given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "The essence of organizational questions, simply speaking, consists of the fact that each one, having the necessary rights for this and bearing complete responsibility within their limits, is occupied with his affairs." Of course, this pertains not only to people invested with power. This also pertains in equal measure to people of all professions who are implementing their right to work and who bear, if not juridical or material responsibility, then in all cases moral responsibility to society for the final result of their labor.

The 26th Congress recommends combining the struggle for effectiveness of political work among the masses with further mastery of the Lenin style of leadership. In the

course of the discussion of the /third question/, the students are offered the broad opportunity to get a deeper understanding of the essence and content as well as the forms and methods of the work of commanders, political organs, and party organizations for the molding of such a style in each leader. It must be remembered that the Lenin style in party, state, military, and other spheres of activity is a phenomenon which is dialectically developing. It is constantly improved in the course of the struggle to implement the party program and policy and in the process of building socialism and communism. At the contemporary stage of development of our Armed Forces the Lenin style in the work of military personnel is, briefly speaking, the aggregate of scientific methods of leadership which permit training and indoctrinating the men most effectively and maintaining the high combat readiness of each military collective.

At the seminar, it is necessary to examine the features of the Lenin style in the work of military personnel in detail and in various aspects. In a compressed, systematized form these features are the following: the unity of theory and practice, a creative approach to all problems, selection of the most efficient ways and means for the solution of pressing tasks; communist ideological content and efficiency, high demandingness, operativeness, and concreteness of leadership; close ties with the masses, the ability to make a critical evaluation of one's deeds, and to react to criticism in a party manner; the display of initiative, a sense of the new, and others.

Let us take, for example, such a feature of work style as a scientific approach to a matter. It presumes on the part of commanders, political organs, and party organizations a thorough analysis of the processes and phenomena which occur among the troops and the scientific organization of the training and indoctrination of the personnel. A creative, scientific approach to a matter means displaying the maximum initiative in work, supporting what is new and advanced in every possible way, and orienting on effective work methods in one's activity. A sense of the new permits seeing in good time and introducing operationally everything that is better, which provides high results in combat training and in strengthening military training.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, the true art of leadership consists not in producing and lavishing directive instructions on each occasion, but in implementing a decision which has already been adopted undeviatingly and in the established time. In connection with this, we should especially distinguish such a feature of the Lenin style as communist efficiency. It presumes an organized system for monitoring the accomplishment of the decisions, orders, and directives of higher organs which have been adopted. Communist efficiency is closely tied with foresight and the ability to utilize effectively the knowledge and skills of people and the capabilities of collectives. It is namely these qualities which help leading officers, with the assistance of party organizations, to concentrate the attention of subordinates on the main thing, to work with perspective, and to see that each one is occupied with his affairs and feels high responsibility for them.

The Lenin style is based on the close tie of the leaders with the masses, on the attentive consideration and use of their richest experience, and on the ability to win the confidence of the masses. The unbreakable tie of commanders, political organs, and party organizations with the broad masses of servicemen, reliance on the experience of the masses, knowledge of their attitudes and needs, and tireless concern for people are the most important feature of the Lenin style of leadership.

The party considers it its duty constantly to consult with the workers on the most important questions of domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, those commanders, political organs, and party organizations which rely on the strength of the collective, on the communists and Komsomols, and on their experience in their work proceed correctly.

The ability to listen to people, simplicity, responsiveness, accessibility, and modesty are extremely valuable for the commander and political officer. Subordinates go to such a leader with an open heart and confident that he will understand them, will give them effective advice, will help to understand everything that is not clear, will be able to dispel doubts, and will instill confidence in their strength. The attentive participation of the commander, political officer, and communist in the fate of a subordinate is favorable for a frank conversation, and this is one of the bases for a strong tie with the men. One should be able to listen patiently to a person regardless of the question with which he turns to him, tactfully convince him if he is incorrect in something, and help him in word and deed.

Of course, sincerity and simplicity in no case should exclude party principles and high and just commander's demandingness. Courtesy and tactfulness should be combined with firmness and consistency in implementing party policy and accomplishing the requirements of the regulations and orders. Only in this way can authority be won among the personnel.

Close ties with the men also presumes constant concern for their needs and requirements, satisfaction of their spiritual and material needs, an attentive attitude toward letters and complaints, and the adoption of proper measures in accordance with them. Thus, in order to master the Lenin style of leadership military personnel should be well trained and comprehensively educated and be able to delve deeply into the essence of the questions to be solved. The quality of leadership, V. I. Lenin taught, is determined "not by force of power, but by the force of authority, the force of energy, of great experience, great versatility, and great talent" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 7, p 14).

The /fourth question/ of the seminar should be examined in a close tie with the question of the increase in the party's leading role in communist construction and its armed defense. Basic significance is had here by the understanding of the fact that the question of the leading role of communist parties in a socialist society has become the nodal point in the struggle of the two ideologies in the contemporary era. Our class enemies are conducting attacks on their activity basically in two directions. First of all, attempts are being undertaken to weaken the party of the working class from within, to destroy intraparty unity, and to force rejection of the principle of democratic centralism. For this purpose, demands for the "right of opposition" within the party are made, so to say, the "right" to intraparty "pluralism," which permits the free existence, within the party, of all types of fractions and groupings with their own ideological and political platforms. It is clear to everyone that the adoption of these demands would lead to the splitting of the party into fractions and would render it incapable of leading society in the spirit of a proletarian-consistent class line.

The course toward the weakening of the worker party from within should, according to the thought of "critics" of Marxism-Leninism, clear the road for another direction

of actions whose goal is undermining the confidence of the people in communists and pushing the party away from the leadership of a socialist society and the state, placing alongside it opposition political organizations around which the enemies of people's power could unite on a "legal" basis. The antisocialist forces in Poland tried to operate in just this way.

As is known, the most important direction in the activity of our party is the direction of the economy. Therefore, bourgeois and revisionist falsifiers selected the economic policy of the CPSU, its course for the development of productive forces in every possible way, and the creation of the material and technical base of communism as the objective of attacks. Placing under doubt the highest goal of socialist production and the policy of the CPSU, despite obvious facts they declare that the party's economic policy contradicts the interests of the people since, they say, it is directed toward "retaining the low standard of living of the population for the sake of capital accumulation." But it is sufficient to analyze the socio-economic program implemented in our country for the 10th Five-Year Plan and the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan to be convinced: the truth is opposite to what the bourgeois "critics" assert. The criticism of various falsifications of the leading role of the CPSU under conditions of developed socialism is discussed more thoroughly in the article by B. Lytov, "The Strength of Truth and the Feebleness of the Lie," published in issue No 3 of our journal for last year.

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ARMED FORCES

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 82 (signed to press 18 Feb 82) pp 38-44

[Article by ColGen V. Novikov, member of military council, chief of political directorate, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Efficiency--A Feature of the Leninist Work Style"]

[Excerpt] Whether you read the program works of V. I. Lenin or his brief service notes pertaining to the Soviet period, you invariably find in them instructions on the principles and methods of party leadership of the building and defense of the new society. Among the commandments left us by the great leader, one of the main ones consists of displaying the maximum initiative, practicality, and efficiency when accomplishing the plans put forth by the party. "...It is namely in the execution of our revolutionary tasks," wrote Vladimir Il'ich, "exactly in the name of the fact that these tasks do not remain utopia or innocent desire but would actually be transformed into reality...we should now pose as our first, next, and main task namely practicality and efficiency of organization work."

The Lenin slogan of practicality and efficiency proclaimed at the dawn of Soviet power has acquired special acuteness and urgency in our time. The growing complexity of the tasks of communist construction and the steady rise in the general educational level of our people cause the necessity to raise the quality and effectiveness of control and improve the forms and methods of party leadership. "We are speaking about developing a work style," stressed Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "in which expedition and discipline would be organically combined with bold initiative and enterprise. Practicality and efficiency--with striving for great goals. A critical attitude toward shortcomings--with firm confidence in the historic advantages of the path which we have selected."

These instructions also pertain in full measure to the work style of military personnel. At the contemporary stage of development of military affairs and under conditions of the international situation which has become aggravated through the fault of aggressive U. S. imperialist circles, the quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrinal process and the combat readiness of units and subunits depend on practicality and efficiency of commanders, political organs, and party organs in considerable measure.

When we speak of efficiency as the most important feature of the Lenin style, we have in mind the organic combination of many advantages which permit a person to accomplish successfully the most difficult tasks and achieve high final results in the best manner, in optimum times, and at a cost of minimum expenditures. Efficiency in the Lenin understanding is primarily the ability to work without fuss and haste and the ability to see the prospects beyond current problems, concentrate on the main thing, bring what has been begun to a conclusion, and ensure the unbreakable unity of decision and execution. Important elements of efficiency are monitoring and checking execution, a critical attitude toward shortcomings, a readiness to eliminate them, initiative, and support of everything new and advanced. Just as the links of one chain, all these qualities are closely interconnected and are unthinkable without one another.

In preparing for the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations the military council, political directorate, commanders, political organs, and party organizations of the Far East Military District are concerned about the creation of an atmosphere of high efficiency in each military collective which excludes irresponsibility and a gap between intentions and actions. Fixed attention is devoted to seeing that all communists--both leaders and the rank and file--show themselves to be examples of organization and an effective approach to the accomplishment of the missions facing them.

Take, let us say, the party organization of the Guards tank regiment where officer V. Buben serves. Here party members and candidates are able to work with initiative, creatively, concentrate efforts on the main thing, and eradicate shortcomings. Thus, once a certain drop in the combat training of the tankers was noticed here. Members of the party committee visited the companies and platoons, talked with people, and analyzed the work of the party organizations in the subunits. And much was cleared up. Some communists--company and platoon commanders, relaxed attention to the improvement of their professional and methodological skill, and the quality of lessons and drills suffered from this. And what about the party organizations of the sub-units, what was their position?

The position, let us say directly, was far from based on principle. Some of the party activists had an excuse: there is, they say, the party committee and it will hold responsible those who work carelessly, are not concerned about the unity of word and deed, and lower the authority and honor of the communist. But really is it not in the company party organization--the place where the communist's training service is in sight of all and where his qualities are molded--that there should be the strictest demand on the CPSU member and candidate member first of all?

On the recommendation of the party committee, party meetings were conducted in the subunits at which a conversation based on principle took place concerning the life's position of party members and candidates and their responsibility for the accomplishment of their service and party duty. The members of the party committee were also concerned that the party organizations carry out everything mapped out by the meetings. Here the listening to reports of the communists and individual talks with them began to be conducted more often, in which regard all this was done with the assistance of the members of the party committee who, by their actions, seemed to provide examples of persistence and energy in the accomplishment of what had been planned. And the result was not long in making itself felt. The effectiveness of party work conducted directly in the subunits was increased, its

influence on the effectiveness of the training-indoctrinal process was intensified, and demandingness toward communists for the accomplishment of their duties increased. This, naturally, permitted raising the quality and effectiveness of the lessons. And the fact that in accordance with the results of the last training year the regiment occupied a leading place in the large unit is, according to the commander's admission, to the great credit of the party organization.

The example which has been presented shows that success accompanies first of all those who, using Lenin's words, are able to "find and firmly seize namely the small link which least of all can be knocked out of his hands, which is most important at a given moment, and which most of all guarantees the possessor of the small link possession of the entire chain."

If we talk about political organs, then for them such a link consists of the primary party organizations, the necessity for the improvement of whose leadership was pointed out by the 26th CPSU Congress. During the time which has passed since the congress, the political organs have begun to analyze more deeply and direct more clearly the activity of the party committees and bureaus. At assemblies and conferences conducted with the chiefs of political organs, we often present as an example the political department where one of the workers is officer N. Petrushevkin. Efficiency, deep delving into the fundamental problems of the life of military collectives, objective assistance locally, the ability to value time and to convert each minute in favor of combat readiness--this is what characterizes the labor of the political department's communists. Frequently visiting the party organizations of the units and subunits, they teach secretaries and members of party committees and party bureaus how to conduct organizational and indoctrinal work, ensure continuous and effective political influence on people, and achieve the unity of word and deed. In analyzing the activity of one or another party organization, the political departments are striving to generalize thoroughly and then to disseminate leading experience, disclose deeply the true reasons for shortcomings, and find ways for their most rapid elimination.

But, unfortunately, there are also other instances. Recently the political directorate analyzed the work of the political organs and party organizations which is directed toward improving party training in light of the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress. And here is what was ascertained. In some collectives the matter went no farther than talks about the necessity to improve training. Let us take, for example, the party organization whose secretary was Senior Lieutenant V. Kalgin. Here they approached the selection of students for the university of Marxism-Leninism without consideration of the categories of servicemen, did not organize a check of their training or assistance for those who needed it, and did not impose a strict demand on the communists who had an irresponsible attitude toward raising their ideological tempering.

The shortcomings were known in the political department. However, instead of reacting to the alarm signals efficiently, sharply, and to the point, they limited themselves to listening to reports by the secretary of the party organization. Of course, he was criticized each time. Naturally, he promised to correct the situation. But time passed and the shortcomings remained.

Who is guilty here? First of all, of course, the secretary of the party organization who did not provide the proper monitoring of the quality of party training. At the same time, we cannot lift responsibility from the political organ, either. If the officers of the political department had analyzed the state of political training in the units and subunits deeply and systematically, skillfully directed the party organizations toward its improvement, constantly monitored the accomplishment of the requirements of party documents and their own instructions and recommendations, and had held those who were remiss strictly accountable, this would not have happened. That is, we are again discussing efficiency and specificity in party work.

Leadership of the primary party organizations is a fine and difficult question. Its essence, of course, is not in general briefings of the activists and not in distributing numerous instructions and the conduct of hastily prepared conferences on each occasion. The key to success is in painstaking work locally, in raising responsibility, and the training and indoctrination of the party activists. Only in this way can the special features and strong and weak aspects of party organizations be well studied, their activity be directed to the required channel, and efficiency in the accomplishment of assigned missions be ensured.

Now, as is known, there is no more important matter for army communists than the persistent and consistent carrying out of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Much is required for this. First of all--a high sense of responsibility and firm, actually communist, conscious discipline. "But just as necessary, of course," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech at the closing of the congress, "is flight of thought, a tireless search for the new, and the support of this new. Constant initiative is needed--initiative everywhere and in everything."

These qualities play a tremendous role in any matter. But their significance is especially great in accomplishing the restructuring of ideological and political-indoctrinal work. In order to conduct it as was required by the 26th CPSU Congress, lively and interestingly, there is a need for constant creative enthusiasm and a tireless search for contemporary forms and methods of indoctrinal influence which meet the increased needs of the men. And here I should like to mention as an example the party committee whose secretary is Major A. Komos.

In the unit, much is being done to transform the party organization into a center for daily ideological-indoctrinal activity. The party committee persistently sees that each communist is an active propagandist and conductor of the ideas of the Leninist party and constantly seeks more effective ways for molding lofty moral-political, combat, and ethical qualities in the personnel. Thus, on his initiative, to improve the indoctrination of the men in a spirit of loyalty to the glorious revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people, and their Armed Forces, the "Podvig" [Exploit] club has been created in the regiment. Along with party and Komsomol activists, veterans of the Great Patriotic War are participating in the club's work. "Podvig" conducted a number of thematic soirees and meetings of army youth with frontline fighters. The participants in former battles shared their combat experience and told of the exploits of their brother-soldiers. But you see, when the club was just created not everyone believed in success. This matter, they said, is new and requires much time and efforts. What is the value of only looking for and attracting former frontline fighters to the work? However, party activists officers A. Komos, I. Karpenko, V. Odorod'ko, and others saw to it that the good idea was implemented. The "Podvig" club became an effective means for indoctrinating the men.

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ARMED FORCES

IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION OF FUTURE OFFICERS

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[Article by Lt Gen V. Serebryakov, member of military council, chief of political directorate of Red Banner Ural Military District: "Improve the Ideological and Class Indoctrination of Future Officers"]

[Text] To train specialists who master well Marxist-Leninist theory, are able to employ it in practice, have a deep realization of our party's goals, and are boundlessly devoted to its great cause--the commanders, political organs, party organizations, and teachers of the military-educational institutions of our district proceed from this requirement in their work. Each year, a new detachment of young officers who possess substantial military and special knowledge and lofty political and military qualities come to the troops. Communist conviction and boundless devotion to their people, the socialist motherland, and the Leninist party are the guarantee and basis of their success in practical work connected with the training and indoctrination of subordinates and raising their combat readiness.

The political directorate constantly directs the command, political departments, and party organizations of military schools toward intensifying the ideological indoctrination of the officer candidates and it sees that ideological work in the educational institutions is conducted purposefully, at a high level, effectively, and with consideration of the requirements of the 26th Party Congress and the decree of its Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinal work."

In a speech devoted to the 50th anniversary of the Komsomol, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that our young citizens should not simply know the basic provisions of Marxist-Leninist theory, but should also find in this theory, in the works of the classics on Marxism-Leninism, and in party documents the foundation, key, and most correct method for the solution of those problems which today's reality places before us. "Consequently, we are discussing," he noted, "the generation of genuine deep Marxist conviction, a clear class approach to all phenomena of public life...." Considering this, the district's political directorate and the party organizations of the schools display constant concern that the entire process of training and indoctrinating future officers is organized on a strictly sustained class basis and see to a rise in the ideological level of all measures being conducted and their influence on the consciousness and practical deeds of the future officers.

The political directorate is trying to make a deep analysis of the status of ideological work on all sectors and of how actively and skillfully the broad possibilities of molding ideological conviction in the officer candidates are employed. Unfortunately, it must be noted that as yet not all training lessons have the class direction and the provisions of Marxism-Leninism on a class approach to the analysis of social phenomena are not always explained deeply and comprehensively in lectures and on seminars.

As is known, the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and other party documents point to the importance of active, purposeful propaganda on communist ideals and the specific practical tasks of the Soviet people and ensuring the close tie between them. However, some teachers still do not have sufficient experience and the ability to show how the regular laws for the establishment of a new formation which, in the form of general theoretical propositions and principles, were formulated by K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin, are actually realized. Sometimes the essence and goals of the Communist Party's policy, the great achievements of real socialism, and the advantages of the Soviet way of life are not disclosed in depth.

To propagandize the achievements of the Soviet people clearly, convincingly, and intelligibly--this is how one of the main tasks which teachers and propagandists are called upon to accomplish can be briefly formulated. It is an important aspect of the ideological indoctrination of the officer candidates and it should not be lost from view. It is necessary to show the young people the tremendous and strained labor with which successes are attained in economic, social, and cultural development and our steady movement forward and to help them to understand that even greater results can be attained only by the efforts of all workers. It is important to stress in every possible way the significance of a conscientious attitude toward the assigned matter and of the high responsibility of a Soviet person regardless of the post which he occupies.

We should also consider the fact that to teach the officer candidate to evaluate social phenomena and processes from class positions means generating in him the ability also to understand the difficulties which arise in the course of communist construction and the readiness to overcome them.

At the basis of purposeful indoctrination and the development, in the officer candidates, of the ability to evaluate facts, events, and processes from class positions are the deep theoretical knowledge of the teachers and their ability to tie theory with practice and specific tasks closely. V. I. Lenin stressed that to pose the question outside the historically-specific situation means not understanding the ABC's of dialectical materialism. The Lenin methodology also has tremendous, permanent significance in determining the essence of a class evaluation of the phenomena of public life under contemporary conditions.

A proper result of the building of mature socialism in our country is the elimination of the exploitation of man by man and of the exploiter classes and the emergence of a society which consists of friendly classes and groups of workers united in a close alliance and headed by the working class. The integration processes in the social structure are growing under the conditions of developed socialism. The convergence of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the people's intellectuals primarily on the basis of the main criterion--relation to the means of production--is occurring.

Now the social strata and groups of the population have changed over to the socio-political and ideological positions of the working class. Already the interests of the entire Soviet people and the interests of socialism and communism as a social system which is opposing capitalism on a worldwide scale form the basis of the criteria for a class approach.

Possessing powerful economic, political, military, and ideological potential, real socialism serves as a reliable support for all progressive and revolutionary forces and an unsurmountable obstacle in the path of the accomplishment of imperialism's aggressive intentions. Therefore, the point of imperialist policy and propaganda is aimed against the USSR and against the ideas of Marxism-Leninism beneath whose banner the international communist movement is moving forward. Under these conditions, the CPSU calls upon the Soviet people not to lower revolutionary vigilance and constantly to strengthen the defensive capability of our state as the main condition for defense of the achievements of the Great October.

For all teachers of future officers, it is important to realize well that the ability to understand correctly the contemporary stage of world social development, the correlation of forces in the world, the achievements of the socialist commonwealth, and the importance of the indestructible unity of the countries of socialism and to proceed from the interests of the world communist, worker, and national-liberation movement forms the basis of a class approach to the evaluation of events and processes. It is also important to teach how to have a deep understanding of the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and to have an irreconcilable attitude toward views and morals which are foreign to the Soviet way of life and which contradict socialist interests and communist ideals.

How can this question be solved more successfully and the purposeful, scientifically substantiated training and indoctrination and high level of party spirit in the teaching of various disciplines be ensured? A detailed talk about this took place recently in the district's political directorate. The chiefs of the political departments of the district's other schools took part in the discussion of the report by the chief of the political department of the Chelyabinsk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineer School, Colonel Ye. Aleksandrov. A useful exchange of opinions took place and specific recommendations were worked out. With consideration of them meetings, conferences, and seminars took place in the schools. Thus, theoretical seminars and conferences were conducted in the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School imeni 50th anniversary of the Great October on the subjects: "Problems in raising party spirit in instruction," "Forms and methods for indoctrinating officer candidates in a spirit of class hatred toward the enemies of socialism," and "A procedure for criticizing bourgeois, opportunistic, and Maoist distortions of the questions of communist construction." Joint thematic sessions of the departments of Marxism-Leninism and the military and general-science departments are conducted regularly here. The question of strengthening the ideological-political direction of the lessons on military disciplines was discussed on one such session.

An important direction in the activity of the political departments and party organizations and the teacher personnel of the school is teaching the officer candidates the ability to approach from class positions the evaluation of the anti-Soviet policy of the reactionary circles of the imperialist states. For example, the teachers of the department of Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the Sverdlovsk

Higher Military-Political Tank-Artillery School stress in their lectures that ideological sabotage of imperialism is directed toward sowing among the Soviet people, including the men of the Armed Forces, uncertainty in the accomplishment of communist ideals and undermining confidence in the policy being conducted by the party. In one of his lectures the chief of the department, Lieutenant Colonel Ya. Streletskiy, noted that in the Pentagon's manual "Psychological Operations" the task is posed to create an atmosphere of dejection, defeatism, and apathy among the Soviet people, to encourage them to place their personal interests above social interests, to intensify their interest in private life in order to reduce their participation in the accomplishment of collective and national tasks, to propagate a sceptical attitude in relation to the political goals and ideology of local or international authorities, to whip up disagreements and discord, and to introduce disorganization and turmoil in the behavior of people.

Exposing the goals of these "operations," the teacher explained that class maturity of the serviceman is displayed in the active support of the CPSU's political course and in the understanding of his labor as a component part of the activity of Soviet people--the builders of a communist society, in the unconditional observance of the standards of communist morals which express the moral position of the working class and of all workers, and in the struggle against deviations from them.

The improvement in the work procedure which is connected with the ideological-political indoctrination of the officer candidates and the molding of class consciousness in them are furthered by the exchange of teachers' experience, the mutual visiting of lessons, and the review of lectures. Thus, the teachers of the Department of Marxism-Leninism of the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School visited 15 lessons and reviewed 18 lectures of their colleagues. The results of such visits and the conclusions of the reviews were discussed at joint meetings of the departments.

Good experience in the instruction of future officers has been accumulated in the Department of the History of the CPSU of the Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Tank School which is headed by Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor-Colonel V. Skrobov. Here, in the course of lectures and seminar lessons the officer candidates are acquainted with how V. I. Lenin evaluated various social phenomena in his works. Then they are assigned the task to study independently and understand the Lenin methods for the analysis and generalization of facts. Such exercises are subsequently made more difficult. The officer candidates themselves learn to evaluate everything which is occurring in the contemporary international and domestic life of our country from positions of working class ideology. This permits checking how the students mastered the provisions of Marxist-Leninist theory and can employ the knowledge obtained in practice.

Thus, on a seminar lesson officer candidate A. Zinovenko, in subjecting to criticism bourgeois falsifiers who are attempting to disparage and belittle the actual achievements of developed socialism, presented the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev that under the conditions of antagonism of two systems comparisons are inevitable--who smelted how much steel, drilled how much oil, produced how much electricity, grain, and cotton. Here, our opponents try to fall silent and conceal the historic conditions under which we and they must operate. And completely specific conclusions suggest themselves: how much would we have done, how far forward would we have gone in both social and economic development if we had not been hampered and if our peaceful labor had not been disrupted by thrusting war upon us, after which tremendous resources were required for the restoration of the national economy.

The political departments and party organizations and the teachers of the schools began to devote more attention to raising the level of ideological indoctrination work during off-training time as well. Political information classes are conducted more often on those subjects which help the officer candidates to understand better the questions of the domestic and foreign policy of the party and the state and contribute to the molding of an active life's position. Here, not only are facts and events reported, but they are also given an evaluation from the viewpoint of the interests of our party and the Soviet people. For example, Colonel N. Khanevichev, in explaining to the officer candidates the reasons for the aggravation of the contemporary international situation, showed the groundlessness of the myth of a "Soviet military threat," and explained that in fact the threat to peace comes from U. S. imperialism.

If we speak of lectures, talks, question and answer soirees, and thematic conferences, many of them are conducted in the schools. Common days for political lessons have also become a firm part of the practice of ideological work. All this, of course, furthers the improvement of the ideological indoctrination of the officer candidates. The task is to raise the level of measures being conducted from day to day and ensure their effectiveness and efficiency. In organizing them, we must proceed from the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee's decree, "On further improvement of ideological and political indoctrination work." It is noted in it that the most burning questions of domestic and international life, the struggle for efficiency of production and quality of work, the strengthening of discipline and organization, and the instilling of implacability toward antisocial manifestations and hostile ideology and morals should be at the center of lecture and mass political work.

An important place in ideological indoctrination work with the officer candidates is allotted to exposing imperialism's ideology and policy and those of its accomplices. Thus, a special section, "Instilling high political vigilance and class hatred toward the enemies of the motherland," is distinguished in the plan of the agitation and propaganda collective of the Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation Red Banner Navigator School imeni the 50th Anniversary of the Komsomol. The members of this collective actively expose the ideological sabotage and aggressive aspirations of imperialism and the bloody crimes of the U. S. militarists. Colonel A. Gulyashinov, for example, helped the officer candidates to investigate more deeply the real state of affairs of the fiction of some bourgeois ideologists concerning the so-called "youth society." In accordance with their concepts, the socialization of the young person should not consist of mastering the experience of the past but, on the contrary, of a break with it, and that the class approach to the phenomena of reality which is inherent in the Soviet youth allegedly impoverishes its world outlook. The officer showed that the goal of such "theories" consists of setting our youth against the older generation and pushing it away from correct class positions.

The unremitting attention to the ideological indoctrination of the future officers in the process of their instruction is bringing success. The achievements of the schools' graduates are evidence of their civilian maturity, high ideological coming of age, devotion to the people, readiness to defend the motherland and the achievements of socialism, and irreconcilability toward any manifestations of bourgeois ideology and morals. Graduates of our schools Major Ch. Makhmudov, Captain A. Parmenov, Senior Lieutenant V. Resnyanskiy, Senior Lieutenants A. Andryuk and G. Bezborodov, and many others showed up in a good light in service.

It can be said that much has been done and is being done in the ideological, class indoctrination of the officer candidates. However, in the work of the district's political directorate, commanders, political organs, party organizations, and teacher personnel of the schools there are many shortcomings and unused capabilities. It is necessary, first of all, to see more persistently that the officer candidates study deeply and thoughtfully the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics and party documents and learn to defend actively and implement ideological convictions. At the same time, in molding a Marxist-Leninist world outlook in the future officers, commanders, political officers, and teachers do not always help them to master the practical skills and ability to employ the knowledge obtained in life. In the elimination of this shortcoming, an important role is played by the well-thought-out organization of probationary work with the troops and the more effective use of such active forms of instruction and indoctrination as conferences, debates, the preparation of papers, reports, course and competitive work, and the broad introduction of the problem method of instruction. Nor can we fail to mention the significance of close ties of higher educational institutions with the personnel of the garrisons. They should be permanent, well thought out, and exert a favorable influence on the improvement of the training and indoctrination of troop personnel as well as of future officers.

The molding of ideological maturity is not only an ideological, but also a socio-psychological process. The effectiveness of ideological influence is intensified when ideas are not only perceived and understood, but also cause certain feelings and emotions. "It has long been known," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "that the truth is firmly assimilated when it is experienced, and not simply taught." The enrichment of the officer candidates' spiritual world cannot be effective without consideration of their age, national, and other special features. Commanders, political officers, and teachers should direct the striving of our youth toward lofty moral and aesthetic ideals and mold a joyful perception of life. We cannot leave out of our reckoning the fact that some young people still do not have sufficient political knowledge and firm convictions. At times youthful maximalism, an insufficient understanding of the possible divergence of ideals from reality, vulnerability, and the inability to give a correct evaluation to some events and facts can lead to one-sidedness of views and incorrect conclusions. All this requires a more flexible, individual approach toward young people and the constant development of their best qualities and ability to evaluate vital phenomena maturely, love labor, respect their seniors, and treasure the material blessings created by the people and the spiritual values accumulated by Soviet society. This requires the conduct of indoctrinational work in a well-thought-out and purposeful manner and the more active use of the rich traditions of the Communist Party, the people, and the Armed Forces in it.

Recently, a soiree took place in the Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Tank-Artillery School which was devoted to the 90th birthday of D. A. Furmanov. Those who assembled heard the recollections of veterans concerning the brilliant life of the famous commissar of the Chapayev Division, looked at excerpts from motion picture films, and sang songs. They seemed to touch a glorious page in the history of their motherland and its army. Taking pride in their participation in the great deeds of the Leninist party and the Soviet people, in their presentations the officer candidates expressed the striving to master the cause which had been entrusted to

them and the difficult and honorable profession of defender of the motherland. One of them read to his comrades with emotion the moving lines of V. Mayakovskiy:

I am happy
that I
 am a particle of this force,
that even tears from the eyes
 are common.
More strongly
 and purely
 communion cannot be given
to the great feeling
 which goes by the name--
 class!

In listening to the presentations of the officer candidates, one could not fail to think that a remarkable replacement for the Armed Forces and their future is growing and being brought up and that soon officers who are boundlessly devoted to the cause of the party and the people will reach the troops. They are performing their military duty in a worthy manner.

In conclusion, I should like to stress once again that the increasing significance of the ideological, class indoctrination of the future officers is determined by the very nature of the present era, the contemporary stage of development of Soviet society, the aggravation of the international situation, and the lofty missions assigned to the Armed Forces by the party. It follows from the requirements of the CPSU concerning the necessity for further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work.

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ARMED FORCES

OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON VIGILANCE AND DISCIPLINE

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank M. Mayenkov: "Always Be Ready for the Protection of the Peaceful, Creative Labor of the Soviet People and the Cause of Peace and Socialism"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The goal of the lesson on this subject is to assist the soldiers and seamen to have a deeper understanding of the meaning of the Lenin legacy for the Soviet servicemen and the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress for the vigilance and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces under conditions of the sudden aggravation of the contemporary international situation through the fault of imperialism and to have a better realization of the patriotic duty of the socialist fatherland's armed defender.

The lesson is conducted with the soldiers and seamen /of the fourth period of instruction at the end of summer training/ by the method of narration and a lively, extensive talk.

Six hours are allotted for the study of the subject using /reserve time/. Of them, two hours should be allotted for the narration, two for self-study, and two for the talk.

It is expedient to consider the following questions on the lesson: 1. V. I. Lenin's legacy for the Soviet servicemen. 2. The 26th CPSU Congress on the intensification of imperialism's aggressiveness under contemporary conditions. 3. Be on the alert, always study military affairs, strengthen discipline.

/In a brief introduction/ it is necessary to remind the students about the patriotic enthusiasm of the Soviet people who are realizing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and preparing to mark an event of historic importance in a worthy manner--the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

In order to work successfully and build communism, our people need peace. The Communist Party and the Soviet government are doing everything to strengthen peace on Earth and prevent war. At the same time, faced by the imperialist threat they manifest tireless concern for the maintenance of the country's defensive capability and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces at the proper level.

In responding to the CPSU's concern for further improvement of the Armed Forces, the Soviet servicemen are persistently raising their skill, discipline, and organization and are striving to attain new positions in socialist competition. They are always ready to rebuff any aggressor who dares to encroach on our socialist fatherland.

1. V. I. Lenin's Legacy for the Soviet Servicemen

The creator of our party and state, V. I. Lenin, worked out the profound and comprehensive teaching on the defense of the socialist fatherland. He was the founder of the Soviet Armed Forces and defined the basic requirements for them and the principles for the training and indoctrination of the personnel. The works of V. I. Lenin contain the basic instructions to the party and the people concerning the necessity to maintain high revolutionary vigilance and discipline and the legacy to the men of the Red Army to be always on the alert and in constant readiness to give a crushing rebuff to the imperialist aggressors and guard the socialist achievements dependably.

By revolutionary vigilance Vladimir Il'ich meant the ability to expose the intrigues of the class enemy however cunning and resourceful he may be and to adopt all necessary measures to suppress his hostile actions. The leader of the workers pointed out that the bourgeoisie are ready for any savagery, bestiality, and crime to defend capitalist slavery which has perished. And therefore "the first precept of our policy and the first lesson...which all workers and peasants must learn for themselves is to be on the alert..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 44, p 296).

V. I. Lenin taught that to be on the alert means, first of all, /to strictly observe revolutionary vigilance/. He placed a deep class meaning in this concept. The leader of the party linked revolutionary vigilance with the development, among the masses and the men of the Armed Forces, of political feeling and the understanding of the acuteness of all forms of class struggle by the workers for their liberation from the power of capital. He considered the most important element of revolutionary vigilance to be the ability to see the insidiousness of the methods and procedures employed by the class enemies in the struggle against socialism and the recognition, exposure, and rendering harmless of their intentions and actions in good time.

High revolutionary vigilance is our mighty weapon in the struggle with the enemies of socialism. Therefore, said V. I. Lenin, it must be manifested in international relations as well as in the resolution of internal questions of socialist construction and on the political, ideological, economic, and military fronts.

In analyzing the aggressive nature of imperialism, V. I. Lenin showed its striving to inflict military defeat on the Soviet state. Therefore, the great leader taught, it is necessary to reinforce political and military vigilance with the proper material strength without fail and to raise constantly the combat effectiveness of the army and its combat readiness.

V. I. Lenin warned that the best army and people who are most devoted to the cause of revolution will be immediately exterminated by the enemy if they are not armed, supplied with food, and trained to a sufficient degree. He repeatedly pointed out

that victory cannot be won without equipment and the ability to use it in the struggle with the enemy. In armed conflict, noted Vladimir Il'ich, "the one who prevails is the one who has the greatest equipment, organization, and discipline and the best machines..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 36, p 116).

The Communist Party is steadfastly putting into practice the Lenin slogan--/to study military affairs in a genuine manner/--just as the other precepts of its leader. The Lenin instructions concerning the necessity for high vigilance, combat ability of the troops, and their unremitting combat readiness are acquiring tremendous significance under contemporary conditions. They sound especially timely now when truly revolutionary transformations have occurred in military affairs.

Among the most important conditions necessary for the victory of socialism and communism, V. I. Lenin allotted an important place to the conscious discipline of the workers. He devoted exceptional attention to /strengthening discipline in the army and navy/. Considering its special role in the attainment of victory over the enemy, the leader of our party and state required that all laws about the Red Army and all orders be executed through conscience rather than through fear and that discipline be maintained in it in every possible way. He stressed with all sharpness: "He who does not help the Red Army entirely and whole-heartedly and does not maintain order and discipline in it with all his strength is a traitor and betrayer, he is a supporter of the Kolchak movement..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy", Vol 39, p 152).

V. I. Lenin considered Soviet military discipline as a special type of state discipline. Its essence is determined by the socialist system of our country and the revolutionary nature of the Soviet Armed Forces which are defending the vital interests of the workers.

In the army of a socialist state discipline is based on the consciousness of the servicemen and on the personal responsibility of each of them for the defense of the motherland. High conscious military discipline is one of the basic principles of Soviet military organizational development which the party has put into effect consistently and steadfastly from the first days of our army's existence. A little more than a year after the adoption of the decree on the organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, V. I. Lenin noted: "The Red Army created unprecedented discipline not beneath the rod, but on the basis of consciousness, devotion, and selflessness of the workers and peasants themselves" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 38, p 240).

Military discipline, being a social phenomenon just as discipline in general, is in a state of continuous development and requirements for it are growing. Under contemporary conditions V. I. Lenin's words are especially significant: "In order to win, the greatest struggle is needed, iron, military discipline is needed" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy, Vol 40, p 220).

In strengthening the country's defense and improving our glorious Armed Forces, the Communist Party is steadfastly guided by the teaching of V. I. Lenin on the defense of the socialist fatherland. This teaching found deep reflection and creative development in the program of the CPSU, in the decisions of party congresses, in the decrees of CPSU Central Committee plenums, and in the Soviet constitution.

The vital force of Lenin's ideas on the defense of the workers' revolutionary achievements received its check as early as the years of the foreign military intervention and the Civil War. Created by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, the Red Army utterly smashed the combined forces of international and internal counterrevolution. Convincing confirmation of the scientific validity of Lenin's ideas were the brilliant victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War when the question--to be or not to be the first socialist state in the world--was decided. Even today V. I. Lenin's ideas inspire the Soviet servicemen to exemplary service to the motherland.

The peaceful, creative labor of our people is under the reliable protection of the Soviet Armed Forces. In the present difficult international situation which has been worked up to the limit by the reactionary imperialist circles, the Soviet servicemen are persistently raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and standing vigilant guard over the fatherland and the achievements of socialism. Successes in communist construction inspire the defenders of the motherland to the attainment of new heights in soldierly labor, training, and service.

The men of the Armed Forces pass on the loyalty to the Lenin ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland from generation to generation like a baton. By their selfless soldierly labor, they are making a worthy contribution to the national cause of strengthening the motherland's might and to the struggle for the building of communism.

2. The 26th CPSU Congress on the Intensification of Imperialism's Aggressiveness Under Contemporary Conditions

The 26th CPSU Congress made a comprehensive analysis of the international situation and pointed out that world imperialism set its course for the undermining of detente and working up the arms race and is conducting a policy of threat and interference in the affairs of others and of suppression of the liberation struggle. "Adventurism, a readiness to stake the vital interests of mankind in the name of its narrow mercenary goals--this is what is manifested in an especially revealing manner in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. "Demonstrating complete disregard for the rights and aspirations of peoples, they are trying to portray the liberation movement of the popular masses as the manifestation of 'terrorism.' They have truly set the goal of attaining the unattainable--placing a barrier in the path of progressive changes in the world and returning to themselves the role of ruler of the destinies of peoples" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 20-21.).

The highest forum of Soviet communists stressed that the policy of the aggressive imperialist forces has already led to a growth in international tension with all the dangerous consequences which follow therefrom. The congress pointed out that the imperialist circles think in categories of domination and coercion. The monopolies need foreign oil, uranium, and nonferrous metals, and the Near East, Africa, and the Indian Ocean have been declared a sphere of the United States' "vital interests." The NATO military machine is actively penetrating here and intends to settle down for a long time. Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean, Oman, Kenya, Somali, Egypt--what next? In order to part with other expenditures and tie its NATO partners to itself more strongly at the same time, the United States is achieving the

expansion of this bloc's functions. The Washington strategists would obviously like to draw dozens of other states into their military preparations and entangle the world in the web of its bases, airfields, and weapons dumps.

Thus, Washington is counting on military force in the solution of international problems and is striving to expand the American military presence in various regions of the world and attain military superiority over the Soviet Union. The arms race which has been unleashed by the United States is increasing tension in the world and the threat of outbreak of war. The United States, as is known, has adopted new programs for strategic offensive forces which are directed toward creating the potential for a first strike. Such armaments include the MX land-based missiles, "Trident" nuclear missile submarines, B-1B strategic bombers, and medium-range nuclear missiles for emplacement in Western Europe (108 "Pershing-2" missile launchers and 464 cruise missiles).

The question of American cruise missiles with different forms of basing should be especially singled out. What is their main danger? It can be recalled that about 40 percent of the total number of cruise missiles will be equipped with nuclear warheads. The yield of each warhead is 150-200 kilotons, that is, it is 10 times greater than the yield of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Possessing a great flight range (up to 3,000 kilometers) and a high hit accuracy, cruise missiles can hit any objectives, including those which are small in size and defended, which are disposed in the depth of the enemy's defense. As a result of their insignificant radar reflection and low flight altitude (down to 60 meters) as well as covert approach to the target using folds in the terrain these missiles, according to estimates in the Western press, are difficult to detect with air defense means. In addition, cruise missiles, without differing in their external appearance, can carry both a conventional as well as nuclear warhead. Therefore, the side subjected to attack cannot establish which warhead the missile is carrying when in flight and is required to proceed from the worst case and react to it in the proper manner.

American strategists calculate that even in the course of a non-nuclear war, by utilizing the high hit accuracy of cruise missiles they can destroy a portion of the USSR's strategic potential. Thus, by taking cruise missiles into the inventory and deploying them, the United States is trying to disrupt the existing approximate strategic balance between our countries. The danger of American cruise missiles is that their mass production, deployment, and accumulation in a short time increases the probability of unleashing nuclear war. And the portrayal of cruise missiles as only an "inoffensive" tactical weapon is nothing more than a subterfuge which is intended to calm public opinion.

The catastrophic consequences which would follow from nuclear war are generally known. But in Washington, in essence, they do not conceal the striving to limit nuclear war within the framework of the European continent and thereby avoid inevitable responsive retribution. However, the calculations of the United States on any "limited" nuclear wars are devoid of any basis. Such a war, if it unleashed, will inevitably turn into general war.

Much has already been said about the danger of neutron weapons. The decision for their full-scale production was made last year by the Reagan administration. This weapon kills everything living but leaves material valuables untouched. No lesser threat is presented by the forced production and accumulation, by the United States,

of chemical weapons and the work which it is conducting in the field of bacteriological weapons. According to data in the American press, in fiscal year 1982 445 million dollars will be expended on the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the following year this figure will reach 810 million dollars. The American army already has at its disposal more than 90 types of chemical ammunition, the total weight of which exceeds 150,000 tons. The transoceanic press boastfully announces that the United States has the largest arsenal of "silent death" in the world.

The Pentagon considers Europe as the main range for chemical warfare (just as for neutron warfare). For this purpose, the United States is intensifying pressure on its NATO partners. Thus, more than 2,000 tons of toxic agents with the mark "Made in the USA" have already been stored on the territory of the FRG. Washington is achieving this from Italy and Britain. The Pentagon is using chemical weapons even today. Bands trained on American dollars for intrusion into Afghanistan are being equipped with bombs with poisonous filling. Chemical weapons are widely employed by the Salvador regime which is armed and under the wardship of Washington and is waging war against its own people. The Cuban press writes that the CIA is using chemical and bacteriological weapons for sabotage purposes against Cuba.

Thus, it can be concluded that the new U.S. military strategy, which Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger has defined as a strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR on global and regional scales, bears an undisguised aggressive character. It contains the line for the forced preparation of the material base for the unleashing of wars of various scales and intensities, in which regard main reliance as formerly is placed on preparations for strategic nuclear war and the multivariant use of strategic forces in such a war--from so-called "limited" nuclear strikes to their mass employment against the entire complex of objectives on the territory of the USSR and its allies.

It should be stressed that along with wide military preparations, imperialism is waging unbridled psychological warfare against the socialist world. The imperialists' main weapon in this war consists of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. In the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union, the imperialists are relying on the most reactionary forces of modern times and using the most refined and most vile procedures. The hysteria raised by the leading circles of the United States as regards events in Poland appears especially unsightly in this connection. The White House is interfering unceremoniously in the internal affairs of the sovereign Polish state and is trying to place on the Soviet Union responsibility for the introduction of martial law in Poland in order to "substantiate" discriminatory measures against the USSR and the further deterioration in Soviet-American relations and the international climate as a whole.

Annoyance that the prey whose skin they had already begun to divide up in NATO escaped shows through first of all in the anti-Polish and anti-Soviet hysteria which has been artificially raised in the United States and other NATO countries. It did not happen. And it will never happen in the future. Never in the past and, what is more, now our country and the other fraternal countries of socialism did not permit and do not permit speaking with them with the language of threat and dictation. The Soviet Union and its allies have sufficient forces and weapons to repel any imperialist onslaught and defend socialist achievements.

In the present difficult international situation, the ideas of the 26th CPSU Congress are acquiring ever greater magnetic force. The Peace Program for the 1980's put forward by the highest forum of Soviet communists has become the most important foreign-policy factor influencing the course of world events. The minds of hundreds of millions of people in various corners of the planet have been attracted to the peaceful Soviet initiatives which are directed toward eliminating the threat of war, the preservation and strengthening of detente, the elimination of hot spots of military conflicts, and the development of equitable international collaboration.

In Washington, unconcealed concern is being manifested as regards the scale of the antiwar movement which is gaining strength in many countries. The transoceanic strategists are obviously concerned by the increase in criticism directed toward them and are adopting all measures to reduce the heat of the mass demonstrations in the defense of peace and distract the attention of broad world opinion from the Soviet initiatives which show a way out of the tense situation which has been formed. The propaganda services of the United States and NATO as a whole are trying to justify their course toward the forced arms race in the eyes of the peoples. They shout so often about the "Soviet military threat." However, it is more and more difficult for the reactionary forces to deceive world opinion and the broad masses of workers in their country by this provocative myth, this long decrepit bugbear. Objective facts and the truth of history itself are against them.

As historical experience shows, it is namely the United States which has always been the initiator of the arms race. Each time, the Soviet Union had to react to the military threat created by the United States and produce the necessary armaments on its part. But the Soviet Union never strived for and is not striving for the attainment of military superiority.

The Soviet Union possesses a great military potential. Any attempts to attain military superiority over our country are doomed to failure. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared in this regard: "If necessary, the Soviet people will find the capabilities to undertake any additional efforts and do everything necessary to ensure the reliable defense of their country."

The defensive might of our country reliably ensures the defense of its state interests, historic achievements of socialism, and peace on Earth. It objectively meets the interests of all peoples and of all fighters for social and national liberation and for universal peace. The party and the state, it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, have not lost sight of the problems in strengthening the defensive might of the country and its Armed Forces for even one day. The conference stressed that the international situation requires us to do this.

The highest forum of Soviet communists called upon the party and the entire Soviet people to display vigilance as regards the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and its stooges. In summoning the Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces to highest revolutionary vigilance and readiness to repel the threat of an imperialist invasion at any moment, the CPSU proceeds from the Lenin requirement to be always on the alert.

The Soviet Union is not preparing for an armed attack on anyone at all. Soviet military doctrine bears a particularly defensive character. The USSR looks upon

nuclear attack as the gravest crime against mankind. "Our approach to such questions," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "can be formulated as follows: the defense potential of the Soviet Union should be sufficient so that no one will venture to disrupt our peaceful life. Not a course for superiority in armaments, but the course for their reduction, for relaxing military confrontation--this is our policy."

3. Be on the Alert, Study Military Affairs Persistently, Strengthen Discipline

Thus, we ascertained that the international situation requires the Soviet people and their armed defenders to display maximum political and military vigilance. It should constantly be remembered that revolutionary vigilance is one of the important factors for the defeat and rendering harmless of the anti-Soviet, antisocialist intentions of our class enemies in the international arena.

Vigilance presumes the high political maturity, class consciousness, and ideological conviction of each Soviet serviceman. These qualities are molded on the basis of a deep study of the immortal ideas and precepts of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the theory and policy of the CPSU, the materials of the 26th Party Congress, and the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on defense questions.

Vigilance is urgently necessary in military affairs. Soviet servicemen who are on combat duty, guard, watch, and interior service, and are on exercises or a long sea or ocean cruise are required to display special vigilance. It is important to have a deep understanding that vigilance for the defender of the motherland is, first of all, his unremitting combat readiness and ability to service complex contemporary equipment and weapons in the most difficult situation and do everything necessary for the decisive repulse of any aggressor. It is also appropriate to recall the great significance of strict observance of military and state secrets and carry out the appropriate provisions of the military oath and military regulations.

The nature and special features of the contemporary international situation impose increased demands for the combat readiness of all Soviet servicemen. There should be no ebbs and flows in it since only the constant readiness of the personnel for the repulsing of the enemy can guarantee the country's security.

The increased requirements for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces found their consolidation in the constitution of the USSR. In a special chapter, "Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," it is stressed: "It is the duty of the Soviet Armed Forces to the people to defend the socialist fatherland reliably and to be in constant combat readiness which guarantees the immediate repelling of any aggressor." This means that each serviceman is required always to be ready to accomplish the combat mission with honor, to strike the aggressor in good time and inevitably, and to frustrate his perfidious intentions against our motherland and its allies.

Today military service imposes especially high requirements on each serviceman and forces him to give all his strength, knowledge, and ability to soldierly labor. It is accompanied by great tension for those who launch missiles, stand at the control wheels of nuclear submarines, or intercept aerial targets, and it requires much knowledge and lofty moral-political training.

The general educational level of the youth which is coming to the Armed Forces has risen noticeably in recent years. This facilitates the task of training skillful and reliable defenders of our motherland. However, by itself a secondary or even a higher education still does not make a young person a good soldier. Generation of the necessary moral-political and combat qualities does not happen in one day. Here, there is no getting by without high consciousness, a deep understanding of the purpose of the Armed Forces and the noble missions assigned to them, and personal responsibility for the defense of their motherland. There is no getting by without persistent labor and the striving to use each minute of training time with the full straining of forces and master their combat specialty expertly in reduced times.

The Soviet constitution states that the defense of the socialist fatherland is the sacred duty of each Soviet citizen, and military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is the honorable obligation of Soviet citizens. And regardless of the specific obligation imposed on the soldier or seaman, he is called upon to make his contribution to the cause of defending the motherland and to work in accordance with his conscience as befits a genuine patriot, internationalist, and Soviet citizen.

Contemporary battle dictates ever higher requirements for missile, field, air, and sea ability of each soldier and seaman, especially for his firing skill. Victory in battle is impossible without the reliable and effective destruction of the enemy by all types of fire. And here much depends on the ability to employ one's weapon skillfully and inflict maximum loss on the enemy at maximum range with the least expenditure of ammunition. The increased combat capabilities of weapons and equipment, their equipping with more improved sights, and the increase in the rate of fire, range of fire, and power of the ammunition pose with special urgency the question of the necessity to destroy the target with the first burst, round, launching, or pass.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War, an average of several dozen shells, and sometimes even hundreds of shells, were expended to shoot down one airplane. And now, as a rule, the missilemen destroy an aerial target with one missile. And what a target! High-velocity, small, and employing jamming. Let one of the specialists make the slightest error, overlook something, or lag behind. And the target may penetrate to the defended objective with impunity and cause great losses. This is why, under contemporary conditions, each serviceman is required to be a master of his specialty, know his weapon to the finest details, and exploit its technical characteristics and combat properties in full measure.

The reliability of armaments and combat equipment depends to a great extent on the quality of their servicing and observance of the rules and conditions for operation and repair. Therefore, it is very important to observe strictly the requirements of the manuals, instructions, and other documents which regulate the care of equipment and the rules for its operation and not to deviate even one step from them.

The high qualifications of the Armed Forces specialists and their wealth of experience in the operation of equipment under the most varied conditions permit finding new, more efficient procedures for its servicing and combat employment. A creative attitude toward their duties engenders valuable rationalizer suggestions which are directed toward a reduction in the times to bring the equipment to combat readiness, raising its reliability, and improving operating characteristics. On the lesson, one

can name the best rationalizers of the subunit, unit, or ship and show how their creative attitude toward matters is displayed.

It is difficult to become a master in any matter, and in military affairs in particular. For the conditions under which the serviceman must operate are usually very difficult; the enemy is active and energetic and he does not excuse the slightest delay or indecision. Therefore, on each exercise there should be the striving to operate as in genuine battle, without simplifications and indulgences. There should be a display of initiative and tactical smartness, the striving to impose one's will on the opposing side, and one's persistent striving to win.

An important means for increasing the activity of the soldiers and sailors in combat training and in mastering military specialties is socialist competition. It has become an integral part of the training process. Competition helps the individual person as well as the collective as a whole to disclose its better qualities and capabilities and find newer and newer reserves to improve skill and pull the laggards up to the level of the leaders. "To work better today than yesterday, tomorrow--better than today!"--this is the principle of the competitors. To raise combat readiness and the level of military skill in every possible way--this is the basic direction of socialist competition in the Armed Forces.

This means for each military person: to treasure training time, to operate on lessons, exercises, flights, and long cruises with the full straining of strength, to utilize the capabilities of equipment and weapons skillfully, and to subordinate one's daily deeds to the common goal--raising the combat readiness of the subunit, unit, and ship. Participating actively in the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR under the slogan, "For the peaceful labor of the Soviet people--reliable defense!", the personnel of our Armed Forces are persistently struggling for the accomplishment of the obligations which have been assumed. This is bringing good results. The number of experts of combat and political training, rated specialists, and expert subunits, units, and ships is increasing steadily and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces is rising to a new stage. It is with complete foundation that the Soviet servicemen can say the words of the soldier's song: "We have both heart and missiles--in readiness number one."

To go forward, to achieve more--this is the golden rule of the Soviet servicemen. Not to stop with what has been achieved, to win new positions in the improvement of military skill--only this approach brings the desirable result. "...In military affairs as, perhaps, in none other, to stop and become complacent means to fall behind," said the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, at the Komsomol election meeting of a Guards motorized rifle regiment of the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin.

It will be appropriate if the leader of the lesson tells about the personal contribution of the best men to ensuring the high combat readiness of the subunit, unit, or ship and of how they are performing their duty to the motherland. Here, it should be stressed that an important mission of the soldiers and seamen of the fourth period of training is to assist the younger fellow-servicemen to master weapons and equipment as well as possible, to give them support in overcoming difficulties, and to prepare a worthy replacement for themselves.

Under contemporary conditions, the significance of military discipline has grown immeasurably. This is explained by the difficult and extremely intense nature of contemporary battle, the employment of qualitatively new means for armed conflict, and the exceptionally high requirements for industriousness and the self-collection of each serviceman. The conscious and strict execution of the order and rules established in the Armed Forces is necessary today as never before. It is vitally important that each soldier and seaman carry out the oath and regulations, orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs, and the requirements of all documents which regulate service and the performance of combat duty implicitly.

To be disciplined is a requirement of the regulations and, at the same time, the moral duty of each Soviet serviceman. Standards of behavior as called for by the regulations are inseparably connected with the provisions of the moral code of the builder of communism. The requirements of the CPSU concerning the moral upbringing of Soviet people and concerning the molding of an active life's position and conscientious attitude toward public duty in them pertain completely to the Soviet servicemen.

The role and responsibility of the troop collectives in the strengthening of discipline in the Armed Forces increased. Their ideological and moral-political solidarity, coordination, and force of influence on each serviceman comprise one of the decisive factors for the successful accomplishment of all tasks in raising combat readiness and the attainment of victory in battle. Man is not an island unto himself. He is always among people. His attitude and how he feels and his successes in training and service depend on the interrelationships established in the collective. And the shoulder of another, elbow of another, and fidelity of another are important under conditions of the Armed Forces as nowhere else. This is why it is so necessary constantly to strengthen soldierly combat amity and troop comradeship. They will help to overcome any difficulties and will contribute to the successful accomplishment of all assigned missions.

In completing the presentation of the material on the subject, the propagandist notes that the reliable defense of the socialist fatherland was and remains the most important condition for the building of communism. It is the sacred duty of each Soviet serviceman constantly to strengthen the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and, if necessary, to defend our motherland and the great achievements of socialism bravely and courageously with weapon in hand.

/In the course of independent training/ it is recommended that the students study the works of V. I. Lenin "War and Revolution" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 32, pp 77-79), "The Fall of Port Artur" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 9, pp 155-156), "Appeal to the Red Army" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 38, pp 234-235); "The Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Articles 31, 32, 62, 63); the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Field of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 21-23, 66); the replies of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the questions of editors of the West German journal DER SPIEGEL (PRAVDA, 3 November 1981); and the speech of Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, at the Komsomol election meeting of a Guards motorized rifle regiment of the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 December 1981).

/In discussing the subject in the course of talks/ the following questions can be given to the students: 1. What did V. I. Lenin say about imperialism as the main culprit and source of wars? 2. What are V. I. Lenin's legacy to the Soviet servicemen? 3. What conclusions were drawn by the 26th CPSU Congress concerning the intensification of imperialism's aggressiveness under contemporary conditions? 4. Why does American imperialism consider itself the world's policeman? 5. Why are requirements for the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces being raised under contemporary conditions? 6. What tasks face the personnel of the subunit, unit, and ship in the current training year?

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ARMED FORCES

REVIEW OF YEPISHEV BOOK ON POLITICAL TRAINING TASKS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 82 (signed to press 18 Feb 82) pp 86-88

[Review of book "Ideyam partii verny" [Loyal to the Ideas of the Party] by A. A. Yepishev, Vojenizdat, 1981, 96 pages, 20 kopecks]

[Text] The year which has passed since the 26th CPSU Congress was saturated with the strained labor of the entire Soviet people which was directed toward the realization of the decisions of the highest forum of communists. Our country has moved forward on all directions of communist construction. The plans for economic and social development are being implemented confidently and the process for the comprehensive strengthening of the achievements of mature socialism is proceeding. All this signifies the regular increase in the leading and directing role of the party in the economic, political, and spherical spheres of the life of Soviet society, in increasing the defensive might of the socialist power, and in its struggle against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and for the preservation of peace on Earth.

The giant tasks put forth by the 26th CPSU Congress urgently require the continuous, purposeful efforts of the party and the people for their successful accomplishment. The main directions of these efforts were concretely defined in the materials of the November (1981) plenum of the party's Central Committee, in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at it, and in the laws adopted by the sixth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

How the Soviet people and men of the Armed Forces are mastering deeply the party's decisions and carrying them out is related in the book of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army General A. A. Yepishev, "Ideyam partii verny" [Loyal to the Ideas of the Party] published by the Vojenizdat. The tremendous historic significance of the 26th CPSU Congress and the first results of the realization of its decisions in the field of domestic and foreign policy and in strengthening the might and defensive capability of the Soviet state are shown in it in compressed form and, at the same time, convincingly.

The book is imbued with the thought of the inseparability of the connection of general party and state problems with the specific missions of our country's Armed Forces and of the organic fusion of the people and the army.

The most important sources of our Armed Forces' combat might consist of the wise leadership of the Communist Party, the indestructible unity of Soviet society, and

the fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR. Thanks to the growing capabilities of the socialist economy, the achievements of Soviet science and technology, and the selfless labor of the people the Soviet Armed Forces are receiving everything necessary to maintain constant combat readiness at the level dictated by the contemporary difficult international situation.

"Experiencing proper pride for the technical equipping of the Armed Forces, the Soviet servicemen render its due to the labor of workers, kolkhoz farmers, scientists, designers, and engineers," writes A. A. Yepishev. "It is namely with their minds and hands that first-class missiles, tanks, airplanes and ships which today permit the reliable defense of the country and, if necessary, launching swift and destructive responsive strikes against the aggressor, were created."

The guarantee of the successful solution of the entire complex of problems in the strengthening of the country's defense is provided by the strict observance, by the party, of such life-tested Lenin principles as the unity of the political and military leadership of the Armed Forces, a scientific character, centralism, and unity of command.

The main directions, content, forms, and methods of party-political work in the units and on the ships, its communist ideological content, concrete definition, purposefulness, continuity, operativeness--everything that gives it a combat, offensive nature follow from these basic principles for the leadership of the Armed Forces and the missions facing the Armed Forces.

Organizing party-political work specifically and purposefully, the author explains, means first of all proceeding from the decisions of the 26th Party Congress. Second, knowing the international military-political situation. Third, considering the special features of the present stage in the development of the Armed Forces and the changes which are occurring in their technical equipping and in the personnel and the system for their training and indoctrination, and achieving conformity of the content of party-political work to the tasks for the comprehensive training of the troops and naval forces.

It is required of commanders, political officers, and all communists that they select creatively and employ means, forms, and methods to influence the consciousness of the personnel and organize and mobilize them skillfully to strengthen the combat readiness of units and ships. And the more difficult and strained the situation in which the personnel live and operate, the stronger should be the political influence on the masses of servicemen.

In disclosing the essence of these principles, the author turns to the instructive experience accumulated in the battles of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar years, and he stresses that under present conditions and in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, higher demands are imposed on party-political work. Political influence on all elements of combat readiness in the name of their improvement, it says in the book, has the greatest effect where creativity is displayed and where the dynamics and quality of party-political work are combined with the dynamics and quality of field, sea, and flight training and the entire process of training the men.

The carrying out of the party's instructions concerning raising the effectiveness of all our work presumes the solution of an entire complex of questions of a military-technical, political, and moral-psychological nature. They include, in particular, the necessity for the even clearer, effective organization of the entire training process and service of the troops and the strict observance of order as called for by the regulations. It is important to create an environment of intolerance toward simplifications and indulgences in combat training and toward the irrational expenditure of training time in each military collective.

The book of Army General A. A. Yepishev discloses the basic features of the Lenin style of party work and subjects to criticism the replacement of live deeds by the generation of paper and the excessive attraction by general, at times ineffective measures. The author stresses that specific, purposeful indoctrinal work directly in the company, battery, department of a ship, section, and crew is one of the reliable reserves which permit raising the effectiveness of combat and political training and attaining the strengthening of military discipline and raising organization and vigilance.

A special chapter of the book is devoted to the molding of the invincible morale of the Soviet servicemen as convinced patriots and internationalists who are boundlessly devoted to the socialist motherland and the great cause of communism. Proceeding from the materials of the 26th Party Congress, the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinal work," (1979), and other party decisions, A. A. Yepishev puts forth a number of important, basic questions which pertain to the restructuring of political-indoctrinal work in the Armed Forces under contemporary conditions which are characterized by the sharp aggravation of the class struggle in the international arena and the intensification of imperialism's ideological and psychological sabotage against the USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth.

Under these conditions the attention of the political organs, party organizations, propaganda activists, and mass media are concentrated on ensuring an even higher scientific level of propaganda and agitation and intensifying their offensive nature, intelligibility, and specific nature. The task is seeing that all those who carry the party's ideas to the masses of servicemen expose the falsity of hostile fabrications passionately and conclusively, and that our propagandists and activists do not sidestep urgent vital questions and do not limit themselves to general formulas but talk with people in a lively manner, interestingly, and in the language of specific facts and convincing examples. Socialist realism provides indisputable arguments in order to strengthen irresistible confidence and a will to fight for the great and just cause of communism in the minds and hearts of people even more.

The party teaches the effective use of the capabilities of developed socialism to intensify the patriotic and international indoctrination of Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces. With all its content and with all means and methods ideological work is called upon to mold in the men a feeling of love for the motherland, devotion to the Communist Party, pride in our people's historic achievements, and constant readiness to accomplish their duty in the defense of the socialist fatherland skillfully and selflessly. Soviet patriotism is international in its essence. The party is struggling decisively against such manifestations as chauvinism and nationalism which are foreign to the nature of socialism.

In raising the pithiness and effectiveness of ideological work, it is important to consider two interdependent features of our time. On the one hand, the tasks of ideological-political influence on the masses are facilitated to a certain degree with the general growth in the consciousness, culture, and level of information of the Soviet people. On the other hand, they are also complicated significantly since ever broader and detailed knowledge and the ability to satisfy the many-sided spiritual requirements of the servicemen are required of the propagandists and agitators. People expect from them not only the truthful and effective presentation of facts, but also their deep analysis, serious generalizations, and practical conclusions. All this causes the necessity for the constant improvement of the ideological-theoretical training and methodological skill of the fighters on the ideological front.

The main thing ensuring the molding of a scientific world outlook, an active life's position, and a readiness to perform one's patriotic duty selflessly and successfully in the Soviet servicemen is the clear understanding of the great ideas and policy of the Communist Party and the contemporary, exceptionally important tasks in the defense of the socialist fatherland. These ideas are served by the entire system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers, political training of warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], political lessons with the sergeants, petty officers, soldiers, and seamen, and diverse forms of agitation-propaganda work.

The book develops the thought that in Armed Forces reality there are no purely technical problems or organizational measures which would not have ideological significance. Combat and political training, the mastery of weapons, the organization of socialist competition, troop exercises--in short, all aspects of the personnel's activity are directly dependent on the quality of propaganda and agitation, their scope, and depth of influence. "Therefore, it is so important," stresses the author, "that commanders, political officers, and engineers, in solving specific tasks of the combat and political training of the personnel, always see their ideological aspect, are able to give the correct political evaluation to phenomena, and possess the ability to maintain our class position unshakable under any conditions."

The high level of consciousness and activity of the men is attained only under the condition of an integrated approach to all ideological work which signifies the unity of ideological-political, labor (military), and moral indoctrination. The integrated approach to the organization of ideological-indoctrinal work provides the opportunity to have an active influence on all spheres of military life, make wide use of various means for ideological indoctrination, and to attract to practical participation in it all commanders, political officers, engineering-technical personnel, and officers of staffs and services.

The entire tenor of service, moral atmosphere in the troop collective, and personal example of commanders, chiefs, and senior commanders exert a strong influence on the consciousness and behavior of the men. Each officer and communist should serve as an example of high organization and moral purity and demand this from others.

The author substantiates the increased significance of military discipline under contemporary conditions and mentions those factors which cause the necessity for its further strengthening. This is, first of all, the social importance of soldierly labor for our motherland and for the defense of the socialist commonwealth from

aggression on the part of imperialist forces which, with their adventuristic actions, are creating a threat for freedom-loving peoples.

Further improvement in the organization of service and strengthening the discipline of the Soviet servicemen are also dictated by the continuous development of military affairs and the mastery of complex weapons and combat equipment. Life demands that the technical style of today's defender of the motherland and his soldierly skill merge together on the basis of high consciousness and state of discipline.

The analysis and generalization of the most essential phenomena of Armed Forces life permit drawing the conclusion that military service, if it is organized correctly, enriches the personality of the Soviet serviceman. He develops lofty moral and professional qualities--honesty, truthfulness, vigilance, clearness and resolve in actions, and the striving and skills to implement the orders of commanders and chiefs quickly and in time.

The book "Loyal to the Ideas of the Party" confirms with its entire content that in the accomplishment of the important missions facing the Armed Forces an exceptionally important role is played by the party organizations which are the cementing force and political nucleus of the military collectives and the source of their spiritual energy. They operate on the front line of the struggle for high combat readiness of the troops and are called upon to be centers of daily ideological-indoctrinal work. This presumes a further rise in their activity and combat vitality, the development of intraparty democracy, intensification of the influence of party organizations on the indoctrination and distribution of personnel, and the personal responsibility of each communist for the assigned matter.

The readers will find in the book answers to such questions as party leadership of the Komsomol organizations, raising the effectiveness of socialist competition, the correct combination of the demandingness of chiefs toward subordinates with fatherly concern for them, and the strengthening of genuine collectivism and troop comradeship.

The profound statement of a number of urgent tasks of party-political work which follow from the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress in combination with practical recommendations on their accomplishment make the book of Army General A. A. Yepishev a valuable help in the activity of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol activists.

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ARMED FORCES

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK, ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 7-9

[Article by Col A. Laryukov: "An Aid to Warrant Officer Political Studies: Implement Congress Resolutions: A Special Kind of Weapon"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Thirty-seven years ago the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, led by the Communist Party, victoriously concluded the Great Patriotic War. This victory was a triumph of a new social and state system, of the socialist economy, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral-political unity of Soviet society and the indestructible friendship of USSR nations.

The war lasted 1,418 days and nights. All this time the party performed extensive organizational and ideological indoctrination work at the front and in the rear. It can be said with full substantiation that party-political work was one of the important factors of victory. It mobilized soldiers for defense of the Motherland, for a resolute struggle against the enemy and for his complete destruction, and it instilled in them courage, steadfastness and confidence in victory over fascism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev writes in the book "Malaya Zemlya" [The Novorossiysk Base of Operations]: "We attached no less significance to party-political support of an operation than to its combat preparation."

The next topic, /"V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party on the role and importance of party-political work in the Armed Forces. Tasks of its further improvement in light of resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress"/, has the purpose of assisting warrant officers in gaining a deeper understanding of the place of political entities in the Army and Navy and gaining necessary knowledge on the theory and practice of party-political work. The study time is six hours, two hours each for the lecture, independent work and the seminar. It is advisable to cover the following issues in the lecture:

- /1. V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party on the role and importance of party-political work in the life and activity of the Armed Forces.
2. Political entities and party and Komsomol organizations of the troops.
3. Tasks of further improvement of party-political work.

1. Party-political work/ is a component part of the Communist Party's management of the Armed Forces. It includes the ideological and organizational work of commanders, political entities and party organizations. It is an orderly system of measures aimed at a further increase in troop combat effectiveness and combat readiness and mobilizing the personnel for successful performance of assigned missions. Marxism-Leninism, Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, and the theory of party organizational development comprise its ideological-theoretical basis. Its primary tasks are to rally military personnel about the CPSU and the Soviet government, strengthen the Army and Navy's combat might, develop high moral-political and combat qualities in personnel and a constant readiness to come to the defense of socialist achievements and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and provide a comprehensive improvement in efficiency, discipline and regulation order in units, ships and subunits.

Lenin viewed party-political work as a very important means of introducing party ideology and politics into troop life and activities and for shaping and developing in the personnel the necessary political and moral-psychological qualities ensuring victory over the enemy. Vladimir Il'ich saw in the strengthened role and influence of political entities and party organizations one of the basic principles of party management of the Armed Forces. He pointed out that the firm foundation of the Red Army was created by political propaganda at the front, by the organization of party members in our Army and by the selfless struggle of the best people from the workers' midst.

Recognizing the great importance of party-political work in the letter of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] CC to party organizations, entitled "Everything for the Struggle against Denikin!" Lenin stated: "Where political work is conducted most carefully among the troops . . . there is no slackness in the Army, its order and spirit are better and there are more victories." This Leninist document became a program for mobilizing personnel and means of the Land of Soviets to defeat the new campaign of the imperialists. It emphasized in particular the need to perform indoctrinal work among workers.

In a number of works Lenin repeatedly pointed out the need for intensifying political work among enlisted men and commanders and he persistently demanded that it be conducted continuously. In letters, telegrams and personal meetings and talks Vladimir Il'ich constantly gave the reminder: "Keep an eye on political work," "Don't slacken political work"; he would ask what steps were taken "to improve political work and to bring courage and awareness to the reinforcements"; and he would advise "checking political work personally." Despite his great workload, according to far from complete data Lenin spoke 216 times at meetings and rallies during the Civil War and foreign intervention, setting an example of truthful, intelligible and well-reasoned propaganda easily understood by workers, soldiers and peasants. With his advice and instructions he helped political workers determine their place among the troops faster, becoming capable of finding the important element and correcting mistakes promptly. He recommended that they indoctrinate personnel vigorously, continuously and in any situation--in combat, in campaigns and in the reserve, to consider political requests and react to them efficiently, not

conceal shortcomings and speak only the truth. Herein the party leader saw one of the chief conditions for the effectiveness of ideological influence.

Many of Lenin's presentations formulated tasks relating to the ideological-political indoctrination of workers. Enthusiasm alone, he emphasized, is not enough to wage war. It is necessary for the masses to be persuaded of its justness and there must be the ability to explain to the masses why they must raise their energy, heroism and enthusiasm by focusing revolution-bent efforts on the next very important task.

Historical experience of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars persuasively confirmed the enormous role of party-political work in developing soldiers' high moral and combat qualities and in ensuring victory over our Motherland's enemies. This work tempered the fighting men's hearts and souls and inspired them to perform exploits. Comrade Brezhnev stated that "party-political work with personnel and their ideological conditioning always has been and remains a powerful weapon of our Army. The force of this weapon has been tested in the flame of battle. Even now it frightens our enemies." This work among the troops always has been and remains an important means for strengthening the Army and Navy's combat might and bringing up personnel in a spirit of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism and strict fulfillment of military and constitutional duty to the Motherland.


"The party sees an important path for a steady increase in combat readiness of the Armed Forces to lie in a further improvement of the troops' moral-political training and reinforcement of party-political work in the Army and Navy," said CPSU CC Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov.

/2. An important place in the system of party leadership in the/ Army and Navy is held by political entities. They have existed since October 1918. The more than 60 years of practice confirm their need and enormous importance in troop life and activities both in peace and in war.

Soviet Army and Navy political entities are the CPSU's managing party entities in the Armed Forces. They are guided in their daily activities by the party Program and Bylaws, congress resolutions, and decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government. Political entities also arrange their practical work on the basis of the Statute on Political Entities and orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, functioning in the capacity of a CPSU CC department, manages party-political work in the Army and Navy. The Bureau of the Main Political Directorate was formed by CPSU CC decree in order to ensure collectivity in resolving the most important issues of indoctrinating cadres of political personnel.

Structure of Political Entities in the
Soviet Army and Navy



- KEY:
1. Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy (in capacity of CPSU CC department)
 2. Party commission (approved by CPSU CC)
 3. Political Directorate of Strategic Missile Forces
 4. Political Directorate of Air Defense Forces
 5. Political Directorate of Ground Forces
 6. Political Directorate of Navy
 7. Political Directorate of Air Force
 8. Party commission
 9. Political Directorate of Railroad Troops
 10. Political Directorate of Military Construction Units
 11. Political department of Airborne Troops
 12. Political directorates of military districts, groups of forces, air defense districts and fleets
 13. Political departments of combined units, separate units, military educational institutions and establishments
 14. Primary party organizations

The role and importance of political entities has risen even more under present-day conditions in connection with the increased complexity of missions facing the Army and Navy. They now devote primary attention to increasing troop vigilance and combat readiness, influence all aspects of combat and political training knowledgeably and vigorously, arrange socialist competition of the personnel together with the commanders, generalize and disseminate foremost experience, and do battle against oversimplification and indulgences in personnel training and indoctrination. As Lenin stated, political entities represent the most successful and advisable form of managing party organizations in the units. "We are winning at all fronts . . . thanks to the existence of communist cells in the Red Army which are of enormous propaganda and agitation importance," said Vladimir Il'ich.

At the present time an orderly and clear-cut system of party organizations exists in the Army and Navy. The procedures for creating them are defined in the Instruction to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, which is presently in force. Party organizations, managed by political entities, firmly and consistently implement party policy in the Army and Navy, rally the personnel about the CPSU, and indoctrinate personnel in a spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, utter dedication to the Motherland, fraternal friendship among nations of the Soviet Union, and proletarian internationalism. With all their work they mobilize service personnel to maintain high vigilance and combat readiness of units, ships and subunits and for exemplary accomplishment of missions of combat and political training and operational readiness, and they assist commanders in making the collective cohesive and in strengthening discipline and regulation order.

The All-Army Conference of Party Organization Secretaries will be a most important step toward implementing resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade Brezhnev's instructions on defense matters, and demands of the USSR Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy aimed at further strengthening military discipline and raising vigilance and combat readiness.

The calling of communists, whether a person be in the Army or Navy, obligates every party member to place higher demands on himself, to be in front always and in everything, and to justify the high trust by personal example. A party member's primary duty is serving the ideas of communism and performing daily, determined work for the good of the people. Lenin's words about the need to be in the thick of life, "to know it forward and backward, to be able to determine the moods of the mass and its actual needs, aspirations and thoughts faultlessly on any matter and at any moment . . . and be able to win for oneself the boundless trust of the mass" apply wholly to the party member. Based on this statement, every warrant officer must organize indoctrinal work with subordinates vigorously and conduct it purposefully and efficiently, in a close link with life and the concrete missions of the unit and subunit. "To raise the people's spirits," as the frontline political workers say, also is a kind of political work.

The conscientious attitude of party members, including warrant officers, toward fulfilling demands of the moral code of the builder of communism and one's own official duties noticeably influences subordinates' behavior. Being

assistants to the officers, they are called upon to serve always as the example for privates and seamen. M. I. Kalinin remarked that "the indoctrinator influences his subjects not only by the fact that he provides certain knowledge, but also chiefly by his attitude toward everyday phenomena. For example, if you speak out against vodka, but you yourself drink, this won't work. If you call for discipline, but you yourself constantly violate it, it is clear that such a call will be ineffective."

Komsomol organizations of the Army and Navy, which function under the management of party organizations, are the Komsomol's fighting detachment. One of the primary tasks of the Army Komsomol is the ideological-political indoctrination of military personnel, development of their communist outlook, and assurance that every Komsomol member sets the example in combat and political training and in military discipline. Komsomol organizations did much to mobilize Komsomol members and youth for a worthy greeting to the 19th Komsomol Congress. The next Komsomol congress will set new tasks for the youth in building communism.

In thoroughly acknowledging responsibility for accomplishing the tasks set for the Armed Forces by the 26th CPSU Congress, political entities and party and Komsomol organizations are devoting primary attention to matters of combat readiness and are directing all efforts at high-quality performance of training missions and socialist pledges made in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation. Party and Komsomol members are called upon to be the party's political fighters, to affirm revolutionary ideology and communist morality, and instil in military personnel a feeling of responsibility for the state of affairs in their own collectives and for the Motherland's security.

/3. An indicator of success in the communist indoctrination/ of military personnel is their concrete deeds and the goals of combat proficiency they have achieved. Therefore one of the most important tasks of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations is to influence actively their subordinates' development of high awareness. It is important for knowledge that is gained to become convictions and a guide to action. This is achieved above all by purposeful and persistent party-political work.

Its basic content now consists of an explanation and detailed study of resolutions and materials of the 26th party congress and the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum; Central Committee decrees "On Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," "On a Further Improvement of Party Studies in Light of Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress" and "On the 60th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"; and speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. These very important documents ideologically enriched the political studies of warrant officers and all forms of ideological work, and gave them even greater purpose and class direction.

Commanders, political entities and party organizations perform party-political work. The effectiveness of its influence on the personnel also depends largely on how vigorously it is performed in each military collective and how actively the warrant officers participate in it. The present-day situation demands additional measures for accomplishing a fundamental turning point in resolving new, current tasks of ideological and party-organizational work for implementing the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The CPSU CC decree dated 21 January 1967 entitled "On Measures for Improving Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," which set concrete tasks for ideological conditioning of military personnel with consideration of the complex international situation, fundamental changes in the organization and weaponry of troops, and the character of contemporary war, became an important document for perfecting party-political and ideological indoctrination work.

This party document emphasizes that a comprehensive improvement of party-political work in the Army and Navy is a very important condition for successful accomplishment of missions facing the Armed Forces. In this regard the work of political entities and party organizations must be elevated to the level of the party's modern demands. This is the more necessary, states the decree, in that there are essential shortcomings in party-political work, some party organizations allow a lack of principle in evaluating instances of a negligent attitude toward service and the unconcern, indifference and conceit of certain party members, and they take insufficiently vigorous steps to improve party management of the Komsomol.

The CPSU Central Committee demanded an improvement in political and organizational work among the troops. The basis of work to reinforce military discipline must be the further strengthening of political indoctrination of all categories of service personnel and the maintaining of firm regulation order in every military unit. Party organizations are obligated to improve their work of developing party members' ideals, irreconcilability toward shortcomings, high moral qualities and responsibility for fulfilling party and official duties. The party Central Committee demanded that political entities concentrate main efforts on lively organizational work in the military masses, study the state of affairs in units and subunits more thoroughly, uncover promptly and evaluate shortcomings fundamentally and take steps to remedy them.

The decree emphasizes that personnel indoctrination must become a daily matter for every officer and all Army and Navy party members. Not one serviceman must remain outside constant political influence.

In this regard warrant officers are called upon to reinforce the ideological conditioning of subordinates and develop high moral qualities in them.

Warrant officers must bear in mind that it is impossible to affirm the norms and principles of communist morality without a constant struggle against anti-social manifestations, crude infractions of laws and military regulations, drunkenness, amoral acts, indifference and parasitism. The experience of foremost subunits indicates that firm military discipline is assured to a decisive extent by vigorous ideological influence on the personnel, where legal propaganda has an important role to play. Use of the entire diversity of forms and methods of this work helps soldiers gain a deeper understanding of the very essence of discipline and military law and order and of their importance for maintaining constant combat readiness.

Verbal agitation has become one of the most accessible forms of party-political work and of constant ties between the warrant officers and subordinates. It is based on immediate contact with people, which makes it an

irreplaceable means in achieving indoctrinational goals. Personal contact with military personnel permits fuller consideration of their interests and needs and on this basis to perform individual work, actively influence the shaping of public opinion, and direct it toward a fight against deviations from regulation requirements. Talks and an exchange of opinions create an atmosphere of confidentiality and comradely frankness. But it cannot be forgotten that any presentation, whether it be a narrative, a review on a certain topic or information on current events within the country and abroad or about unit life must be built on concrete facts and examples, vivid and understandable to the personnel, involving the military collective's missions. The basic method of party-political work--and this must be remembered constantly--is persuasion and personal example.

Socialist competition now has developed among the troops under the motto: "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" The CPSU CC Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" states that "competition is called upon to become an effective means for mobilizing the workers to implement resolutions of the 26th party congress and strengthen the economic and defense might of our socialist Motherland." Consequently, warrant officers should concentrate primary attention on fulfilling the current year's plans and pledges, at a further increase in combat readiness, an improvement in military proficiency and a strengthening of discipline and order among the troops. This then will determine the warrant officers' real contribution toward accomplishing tasks of the second year of the Five-Year Plan and strengthening the Motherland's defenses.

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ARMED FORCES

LACK OF INFORMATION ON "ZAPAD-81" CRITICIZED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) p 11

[Article by ZNAMENOSETS correspondent Maj V. Litovkin, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "Zapad-81: Exercise Experience into Troop Practice: Clipped Wings"]

[Text] The files of military newspapers and journals with articles on Exercise "Zapad-81" did not appear very inviting. Many pages were frayed, and someone had underlined entire paragraphs in articles and reports and left exclamation marks and brief, illegible notes on the margins.

Company Komsomol organization secretary Sgt V. Borisevich said as if to apologize:

"So many soldiers use the files... They make excerpts, discuss what they read, argue and compare."

We were conversing in the reading room. On the wall was a display on the exercise, where amateur photos of the company photographer were located together with colorful illustrations from journals. The photos had been taken directly in the field at the fighting vehicles of those who had distinguished themselves in the exercise, surrounded by comrades or in a swift attack. And there was the appeal: "Tankman! Study the experience of exercise participants and apply it in practice!"

Just how does the experience of experts in "Zapad-81" serve for today and how are tankmen fulfilling the call inscribed in the reading room? I visited a tank gunnery practice in the field and saw this. Crew commanders and gunners functioned capably. The stopwatch of Sr Lt A. Gordeyev, the class instructor, repeatedly registered the personnel's high results. They quickly located targets, determined the range to them and accomplished fire missions accurately. Each one kept within the norms. The young privates also felt confident at the tank control panel and the simulator along with personnel of the second year of service.

Now the frayed files of military newspapers and journals and amateur photographs in the display in the reading room took on quite a different appearance. They had not been prepared for display or for the stillness of a museum, but for work, for concrete propaganda of experience. It is well that they enjoy such popularity and that the proficiency of those who distinguished themselves in the exercise has become a good support and reference point for the other tankmen.

And how do those subunits which did not take part in the maneuvers propagandize experience of Exercise "Zapad-81" and adopt it in practice? I tried to find an answer to this question by visiting the tank training company where Capt Ye. Krupot serves.

I will say immediately that much of what I saw and heard there caused bewilderment: The fact that means of visual agitation in the weapons compound did not have a word to say about Exercise "Zapad-81," that it was not even mentioned in the tank gunnery practice, and that cadets' combat training was organized at a poor methods level and NCO's did not even attempt to make the classes interesting and intensive. For example, at the training station where norms of stripping and assembling the machinegun were practiced neither the instructor Jr Sgt S. Latushkin nor his subordinates had even a watch. According to the plan Sgt I. Fel'deshi was supposed to teach the cadets to accomplish fire missions, but he turned his back on the soldiers and accomplished them himself. His subordinates either dozed or quietly discussed abstract topics among themselves. Capt Krupot, the senior officer in the weapons compound, looked into the classroom and found nothing blameworthy in the NCO's actions. Obviously both the junior commanders and their supervisors here had become accustomed to such a "methodology."

None of the NCO's whom I had occasion to meet knew anything about what missions tankmen had accomplished in the "Zapad-81" maneuvers and how they had done it, what targets they had fired on, and how the proficiency of commanders and gunners had been manifested. What is there that is new and interesting from the experience of soldiers who distinguished themselves there that they can adopt? Sgt Fel'deshi merely shrugged his shoulders:

"I was not in the exercise. I don't know how the tankmen functioned there. We weren't told about it."

Capt Krupot also made a helpless gesture:

"No one from the company took part in the exercise. Where can we get the information?!"

Sr Lt A. Ked, the company political deputy, and battalion political worker Sr Lt P. Chizhik reasoned approximately the same way. But articles on the exercise containing bits of experience were published in the central and district press. Prior to our meeting the newspaper VO SLAVU RODINY published an article by Gds Sr Lt V. Mityagin, commander of an outstanding tank company, entitled "At Long Range" under the rubric "Adopt Foremost Experience in Practice." The author examined in detail the methodology of training personnel in accurate firing and in accomplishing fire missions, and he gave useful advice tested in Exercise "Zapad-81." But it was as if the subunit had not seen this article, as if they really do not read newspapers.

There also was not a word about the exercise experience in the company reading room, and work plans of the Komsomol bureau headed by Jr Sgt A. Drabkovskiy and plans of the party organization where Sr WO S. Sinitsa is secretary were silent about the need for studying and implementing it.

Many articles about the exercise have been assembled in the garrison officers' club, which is across the road from the tankmen's barracks. Tales about distinguished persons and experts in military affairs, including from this unit, have been assembled in its displays, photo exhibits, reference information center and special folders. Take it, study it and apply it in practice. The old truth that experience lends wings has long been familiar, but for some reason people here ignored it. They clipped these wings.

Just how did it happen that no one even thought to take up this matter in a company preparing future tank commanders and gunners where, as they say, it is prescribed by service obligation to make use of foremost techniques and methods of training and indoctrination? Why did instructors of classes with cadets, including the NCO's, remain aloof?

One answer suggests itself: Inertia and the habit of not burdening themselves with extra trouble played a part, while they justified their inactivity by saying that we allegedly were not in the exercise and don't expect anything of us.

But can we really call this approach to work a party approach?! Speaking at the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "It is necessary for every party member--and there are almost 18 million of us--to give all his efforts, experience and knowledge in his own area for seeking reserves and increasing labor efficiency..."

"Of course we overlooked this matter," agrees Sr Lt Chizhik, "but we too can be understood: Can newspapers really replace direct contact with an exercise participant with his lively tale about events which occurred?.. Only where are these participants? You won't go looking for them in the unit of which you spoke."

There was no need to go looking. They lived in the neighboring barracks, to which it was less than 30 m from entrance to entrance. We invited two of them to the reading room. A few minutes later Sr Sgt S. Al'berg and Sgt A. Antilevskiy arrived. They had been decorated for high military proficiency displayed in Exercise "Zapad-81" with the medal "For Distinction in Military Service" 2d Class. An interesting and instructive discussion began about the ability to locate targets quickly, determine the range to them without delay, accomplish fire missions exactly and better the narrow bounds of the norms. They told in detail about combat actions and cited curious details and observations which were useful to everyone.

It is unfortunate that Sgt Fel'deshi and the other junior commanders and cadets--the future tank commanders and gunners--did not meet with them and hear their story. They have something to learn and adopt from their neighbors. By the way, perhaps such a meeting now will take place: The exercise participants already are known even from appearance and it is only a stone's throw from barracks to barracks.

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AIR FORCES

AIRCRAFT TESTED FOR LOW-ALTITUDE FLIGHT

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 May 82 p 6

[Article by N. Oreshina: "At Low Altitudes"]

[Text] Next to the test pilot. The sky is bottomless, but we are just a few meters away from the ground. The tops of the trees flow under the fuselage of the airplane, and the needles, branches, and trunks merge into a swift-moving stream. Only in the distance, at the horizon, does the earth slow down so that you can make out towns. The clusters of buildings do not get your attention, but the television tower, the church, and the power transmission lines strike your eye: you notice them immediately.

I saw the face of Honored Test Pilot V. I. Loychikov in profile: an oxygen mask and a protective helmet. Only his forehead and part of his cheeks and eyes beneath his light-colored brows were visible. He had a calm look, no squinting or tension. His concentration showed only in his short, precise movements. The stream of air near the ground is dense and elastic, and the pilot must react instantly to the slightest deviations.

From the minute that the instruction "Flight on a low-altitude route authorized" came over the air and the plane began hugging the ground it was as if we had left the ordinary world.

Loychikov had told me about the maneuvering capabilities of an aircraft at minimum altitudes, while helping me prepare for the flight the day before it. On a board he drew S-turns, conventional turns, and the trajectories of maneuvers for attacking small ground targets. Everything is perceived differently in the air. Even in straight flight you do not manage to catch the readings of the radio altimeter and check the course and velocity by instruments; all your attention is absorbed by the ground. Its proximity casts a spell and distorts the altitude, while the speed seems to deform space and upset your sense of time.

In a steep bank the plane lay on its wing and the entire canopy transparency of the cockpit to its very highest point was covered by a fantastic picture of fields, woodlines, and roads. As we circumscribed a circle it seemed that the plane was making its 360 degree turn not in the air, but on the ground.

Loychikov's face was thrown back, his eyes fixed at a point on the horizon. The arrow of the vertical speed indicator was frozen at zero: no altitude gain or loss.

A railroad bridge spanned the stream. We leaped out onto it, flying above the highway which split the forest like a crack.

There was a lurch as the afterburner was engaged. The plane gained altitude in a spurt as it made a battle turn. It seemed as if the ground was falling out from under us. The overload was as usual, like a heavy pack slipping off your back. Without it flying would seem shapeless and flat, like a painting done from a sculpture.

The blueness of the sky and the sun burst into the cockpit. The world opened wide again, unhurried and slow in its ordinary enormity. It was as if the plane had stopped moving and was hovering. How easy it seemed now, looking from such an altitude, to evaluate direction and find the stream, the railroad roadbed, and the station. But the main thing my visual memory preserved was the last thing I was able to catch a glance of on the ground: the girders of the bridge with the housing of a tractor and trailer nearby.

In a half-roll the aircraft almost lay on its back, its nose directed beneath the target. The bridge, like a hyphen between the two banks, could be seen in the plexiglass of the canopy over our heads. This was the attack. The intertwined iron and concrete, the rails, and the channel of the river were all drawing close, becoming larger and more detailed. The recovery from the attack was careful and economical. We left the target swiftly, at the same live-saving minimum altitude, where the sights of antiaircraft guns cannot catch you and the guided missile guidance system will not be able to operate.

Many times while listening to the stories of veteran pilots, reading memoirs of air force commanders, and thinking about their heroic deeds and experiences I have tried to imagine how our ground attack planes flew at tree-top level over enemy-held territory during the Great Patriotic War.

M. Gallay, Hero of the Soviet Union and Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, explains in his book "Cherez Nevidimyye Bar'very" [Across Unseen Barriers], "It is hard even to see a plane flying right close to the ground. It doesn't show a full sphere as it would up in the sky. You only see the top half."

In his book "Krylatyye Tanki" [Winged Tanks], Maj Gen Avn S. Aleksandrov writes: "We usually bombed from tree-top flight. We flew beneath low clouds, 'lower than a skid,' the pilots would say. We attacked maritime transports from low altitudes."

They attacked from tree-top flight, from steep climbs, and hunted for the enemy in S-turns and tacks -- everything was done at minimum altitude. War forced them to use tree-top flight to leave after an attack, to carry out antiaircraft defense maneuvers, and to make quick dashes to clarify locations. In addition, the war compelled modifications of those aspects of procedures that had not been fully considered and thought through or which were underestimated.

Today there are different aircraft and different speeds. And flying at low altitude at speeds 2-3 times as fast as formerly creates a special situation.

"The course is monitored by a swift movement out of the corner of the eye, and all attention is focused on the ground." "Your neck and arms get very tired. Your head is almost in a fixed position, but your hands are tensed for quick movements. The constraint does not disappear until a habit is developed" — these are comments by military pilots on their sensations. "You monitor the work of the engine by ear. In such flying your senses are so sharpened that you hear every rustle in the engine perfectly. Any sound which is new registers in your consciousness. A flicker on any warning light forces you to immediately gain a little altitude, look around, and then go back down."

Naturally, even an experienced pilot who has not had much practice in this type of flying can hold a minimum altitude for only a limited time. And will power is not enough. It forces you to hug the ground, but only a stable habit will permit you to continue the flight. In this connection I recall a certain flight at minimum altitude over the sea, with the foaming crests of the waves close below. The very young ship commander was performing this assignment for the first time.

The pilot appeared calm outwardly, but when the calculated time for the straight passage was completed and it was time to change course he pulled the control wheel "toward himself" hurriedly, with relief. His face seemed to soften, and the tension left his back and shoulders.

While mentally picturing the map of the terrain, remembering and noticing the distinctive landmarks that at high speed and low altitude sometimes change beyond recognition, the pilot must constantly understand his location. But in winter the roads, streams, and ravines are covered by snow and not distinguishable. In the spring during the flood period well-studied terrain seems unfamiliar. In the fall the uniformity of colors evens out the relief. And in summer the glass of the cockpit is smudged by insects striking it. At such low altitudes the air intake may be choked by a bird; turbulence, the "ruts" of descending streams and "bumps" of ascending streams ripple the air road invisibly and dangerously, and although the pilot does not always sense the unpleasant phenomena of bumpy air because of his great mental exertion, the fatigue accumulates.

But after all, the meaning of the assignment is not the flight itself, not simply flying the airplane; it is destroying objects on the ground, usually camouflaged. They must be spotted, recognized, and a plan of attack adopted. And there is just a matter of seconds to do this.

Analyzing the activity of a pilot at minimum altitude, psychologists determined that searching for a small target, recognizing it, and planning the maneuver focus and concentrate the pilot's attention so much that he does not notice a change in the instrument readings at first glance, as usual, but only on the third glance. He does not even notice a gain or loss in altitude immediately.

This means that more is needed than simply practicing switching attention from the instrument panel to scanning the space outside the cockpit, carefully honed

vision, and coordination of movements. One must be able to become accustomed to the unusual. Many things in the habits of the machine begin to seem unexpected and alarming.

While still on the ground, during drill in the cockpit, the pilot must "run through" all his actions during the upcoming flight mentally. He must drill to develop the ability to identify the object by the minimum number of features.

But probably the most important thing is the mental attitude. Pilots say, half joking and half serious, "before such a flight you cannot have your wife complaining at home or the command criticizing you. You have to sleep well, and have a better breakfast..." Flying experience and the conclusions of aviation psychologists prove that "flight at low altitudes is possible for any pilot who has mastered its specific features."

When poor visibility and the topography do not allow flight at minimum altitude, the pilot is aided by many different automatic control systems. They make it possible to fly at altitudes and speeds which a human being operating on manual control could endure for only a short time. Automatic systems can be taken to the training field or any other point programmed in the flying region and help carry out bombing missions or missile launches.

Low altitudes are not used only to intercept a low-flying target or for work against ground objects. A fighter plane may limit an enemy aircraft's maneuvering by driving him close to the ground. But to do this the pilot must have completely mastered all the procedures of low-altitude aerial battle.

There is some kind of majestic and attractive force in flying at minimum altitude. The proximity of the ground instills character and a sense of responsibility, hones skills, and forces the pilot to make a sober reassessment of his skill and flight capabilities. It disciplines the pilot and is more demanding than the most critical referee. It is like conscience, an examination of oneself. Preparedness to fly at low altitudes is a guarantee of safety at all altitudes.

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
GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE UNIT: DEFENSE OF GORGE DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) p 10

[Article by Capt V. Kozlov, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Tactical Weapons Training: A Squad Defends a Gorge"]

[Text] Sgt T. Mamatsashvili, commander of a motorized rifle squad, received the order to defend a position on a dominant hill (see diagram) with the mission of preventing the passage of "enemy" tanks and infantry through Glubokoye [Deep] Gorge.



KEY:

1. Motorized rifle squad No ...
2. Reference point No ...
3. SO [Concentrated fire] 1

After appointing Pvt M. Mikheyev as the duty observer, the squad commander assigned combat missions to each subordinate. He ordered driver-mechanic Pvt I. Mirzokeyev to place the infantry fighting vehicle in a deep depression at the very crest of the hill. In this case it was possible to conduct fire in any direction while large boulders reliably protected the BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] against aimed "enemy" fire.

The sergeant indicated a place on the right flank for Pvt R. Tvauri, who hits targets expertly with the rocket launcher at maximum range. This position allowed conducting fire against armored targets along the route even before they came up to the gorge.

Then Sgt Mamatsashvili decided on the location for machinegunner Pvt I. Babayev. The spacious area, reliably protected by rocks, provided a good field of view and allowed conducting aimed fire along almost the entire road leading up to the gorge.

The squad commander determined duties for the remaining riflemen just as thoughtfully.

Many rocks were piled up on the right flank of the position at the very edge of the cliff. In case the "enemy" penetrated into the gorge the defenders could arrange an artificial rockfall by detonating explosives.

The squad commander realized that, figuratively speaking, the favorable position on the dominant hill permitted holding the key to the gorge in his hands. At the same time it demanded careful camouflage assuring surprise in the motorized riflemen's actions. The sergeant attached special importance to this. It is true that some soldiers overdid it in camouflaging. When Mamatsashvili looked at the squad position through "enemy" eyes, he immediately picked out many flaws in camouflage of the trenches: The breastwork of missileman Pvt A. Tovmasyan's emplacement was excessively "planted" with sweetbriar branches and that of Pvt I. Babayev was revealed by a heap of black rocks.

The shortcomings were remedied immediately. In the time remaining until the "fight," Sgt Mamatsashvili checked the possibility of conducting fire from all organized emplacements along the established directions. He did this by laying the weapon on assumed targets.

...Observer Pvt Mikheyev reported the appearance of an "enemy" APC. The squad commander ordered rocket launcherman Pvt Tvauri to destroy it. The target was hit with the first round. Here is a minor detail: The characteristic cloud of dust which usually reveals a gunner during firing did not appear above the private's emplacement. In preparing the position for combat the soldier carefully placed pebbles on the soil behind the rear wall of the emplacement so that the stream of gases did not raise dust at the moment of firing.

The knocked-out APC stopped directly on the road, but soon three more APC's appeared from behind the small hill with the trig point. The motorized riflemen waited until they came closer and began to pass the standing vehicle,

presenting their sides for aimed fire. Here again Pvt Tvauri distinguished himself. He used only three rounds for the three new targets. The squad destroyed the surviving force which dismounted from all authorized weapons, coordinating with the neighbors.

Sgt Mamatsashvili controlled his subordinates' fire precisely. When the attackers' main body came up to the position, he took squad fire up to maximum intensity. Nevertheless, despite the dense fire, a portion of the "enemy" forces succeeded in penetrating right up to the defenders. There appeared the threat that he would penetrate into the gorge, which could in no way be permitted. With the platoon commander's authorization Sgt Mamatsashvili detonated the preset charge, thus creating an artificial rockfall. The entrance to the gorge was reliably closed. The motorized riflemen destroyed "enemy" fighting vehicles and infantry which penetrated to the gorge by fire from above from all available weapons as well as hand grenades.

The fight for the mountain gorge against superior forces demonstrated the reliability and inaccessibility of a defense when it is well arranged and when the defenders take advantage of all their capabilities for holding positions.

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GROUND FORCES

MT-12 ANTITANK GUN DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 12-13

[Article by Engr-Col V. Knyaz'kov: "About Combat Equipment for the Future Soldier: 100-mm Antitank Gun"]

[Text] The command came: "Tanks on the right! Action!"

Immediately the covers fly from the breech and muzzle brake, the trails are spread and ammunition prepared. The breech mechanism clanged and the massive "wedge" securely locked the bore. The crew kept within a rigid norm--it took less than a minute to convert the gun from a traveling to a fighting position.

The round lashed out and the target moving in the distance shuddered and froze. Ten seconds later another round was fired and the next target was enveloped in black smoke.

That is how one of the present-day artillery pieces--the 100-mm antitank gun with smoothbore barrel--fires. It is intended to hit enemy armored targets--tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, APC's and so on. It also can be employed for fire against armored cupolas and embrasures of permanent-type pillboxes and earth-and-timber emplacements, and for destroying enemy personnel and weapons in the open and behind light cover.

It stands to reason that fire from the gun is most effective with direct laying. In this case the gunner sees the target directly in front of himself and lays the sight crosshairs on its most vulnerable spot. With such firing the round literally creeps along the ground. Hence the origin of the concept of flat-trajectory range: This is the range at which the trajectory of the projectile's flight does not exceed target height. It very considerable for the 100-mm antitank gun, attaining 1,880 m with a target height up to 2 m!

For example, in order to destroy a tank one must hit it as hard as possible with a projectile, simply speaking. Then the armor will be penetrated. But what does it mean to "hit hard"? We know from the course in school physics that the amount of shock effect depends above all on kinetic energy of a moving body, which in turn is dependent on the body's mass and rate of movement. The conclusion suggests itself: We must take a heavier projectile and bring it up to speed faster--then no armor will withstand it.

But this approach is somewhat primitive, for few will take it into their heads to use, for example, the Czar's cannon, with a total weight of some 80 tons together with the carriage, for firing against tanks. One also can see the projectiles for it on the grounds of the Moscow Kremlin: hollow cast-iron balls weighing one ton each. Of course such a cannonball can do some damage to a tank, but will the fire be effective? Hardly, for the projectile's casualty effect also is determined by its design, shape, strength of the hull, angle of impact with the armor and, finally, the strength of the armor itself.

Artillery rounds with quick fire fixed loading are used for firing the gun, and that is what they are called--quick-fire fixed rounds. The artillery round is the sum total of projectile, fuze, propellant charge, casing and means of igniting the charge. In the quick-fire fixed round all these elements are combined into a single whole with the help of the casing, so that the piece is loaded in one movement. The round may have different projectiles: armor-piercing composite shot, shaped-charge fragmentation, or HE fragmentation.

Let us examine, for example, the design of the HE-fragmentation shell. It is unique. We will recall that the gun tube is a smoothbore barrel. That means there are no traditional grooves inside the barrel. Hence the primary feature of the projectile--it is nonrotating. It is given stability in flight by a stabilizer, which can be easily seen in the drawing [drawing at end of article].

The shell fuze has three settings: fragmentation effect, HE effect, and HE with delay. Depending on this, the shell may burst at the surface of an obstacle or within it and hit both targets in the open and under cover. The HE-fragmentation shell is made as a tracer. The tracer is intended for observation of the shell's flight trajectory. In burning it produces a fiery trace clearly visible at any time of day.

The HE-fragmentation shell can destroy targets at a range up to 8,200 m. The weight of the round with projectile is some 29 kg, and the weight of the projectile itself is nearly 17 kg.

The maximum rate of fire of the gun is 14 rounds per minute, with the aimed rate of fire somewhat less--6 rounds per minute. Nevertheless, this indicator is considered sufficiently high. Just supply the shells, as they say.

Now let's turn to a few design features of the gun. They affect its combat capability to a certain extent. On the whole the configuration of the piece is in the classic layout: a long barrel with breech mechanism placed on a carriage. The barrel consists of a smoothbore monobloc tube with tube muzzle brake, breech ring and collar.

The carriage includes the cradle, recoil system, saddle, laying mechanisms, balancing gear, saddle support with spring suspension, trails, wheels, gun shield and sights.

The cradle--a cast cylindrical collar--serves to guide the tube during its recoil and run-out.

The recoil system includes a recoil buffer and recuperator. They first of all absorb the energy of the recoil and as a result the round's effect on the carriage is reduced and the gun's stability during firing is achieved. Secondly, they return or, as the specialists say, run out the tube and other parts to the initial position. Moreover, they hold them in this position at all possible quadrant elevations in intervals between rounds.

The saddle is the base for the gun's tipping parts. The laying mechanisms (elevating and traversing gear), balancing gear and gun shield are mounted on it.

The gun is supplied with a semiautomatic breech mechanism. After a round is fired it opens independently. The laying mechanisms--handwheels of the elevating and traversing gear--are conveniently located directly under the layer's hands.

Artillery has the concept of the maneuver of fire or, as it is sometimes said, the maneuver of trajectories. In practice this means the capability to shift fire rapidly from one target to another within the broadest possible limits. Traverses are of no small importance here. For example, the gun's total traverse is 53-54°, maximum quadrant elevation is 19-21°, and maximum angle of depression is 6-7°.

The reader of course realizes that the battlefield is no asphalt highway, and the weather too can vary. Whether the rains fall or snow piles up, it is still necessary to fight. How will the gun perform under such conditions?


The designers provided for a great deal to facilitate crews' functioning under conditions of difficult terrain. The authorized MT-L and MT-LB tracked prime movers easily transport a gun weighing 3,100 kg off the roads, since the piece has excellent torsion spring suspension and sufficient clearance--380 mm.



If the road is good, the gun's maximum speed behind a prime mover can reach 70 km/hr.

But anything can happen under combat conditions. Let's imagine that there is untouched snow or a marshy sector in the artillerymen's path and it is impossible to go around. What can be done? The ski unit helps out. It serves to transport the gun over deep snow cover and swampy terrain. The gun is rolled onto the skis by its wheels and fastened with overlaid chains. And of great value is the fact that the ski device permits firing directly from the skis.

If necessary the crew can move the gun by hand as well. To this end a wheel is placed under the rear part of the trails. It ordinarily is fastened to the left trail by a lock.

The MT-12 100-mm antitank gun is a powerful artillery piece and a reliable means for hitting various targets in modern combat.






HE-Fragmentation Shell

- 21. Nose fuze
- 22. Bursting charge
- 23. Shell body
- 24. Stabilizer
- 25. Tracer
- 26. Stabilizer blade

Round with HE-Fragmentation Shell

- 27. HE-fragmentation shell
- 28. Upper part of charge
- 29. Lower part of charge
- 30. Igniter
- 31. Flash-eliminating powder



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GROUND FORCES


TACTICAL EXERCISE PROBLEM COMPETITION: SERIES 5

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) p 14

[Article: "Our Contest: Tactics and Fire-82"]

[Text] Problems of the Fifth Series

1. Tank Platoon in GPZ [Advance Party]



The 1st Tank Platoon with a motorized rifle and combat engineer squad has been assigned from the battalion as a GPZ. At 1350 hours the GPZ approached the bushes 500 m east of Ivanovka. The patrol vehicle, the second tank, moved to the outskirts of Ivanovka. The patrol vehicle commander reported that an APC was moving from Brody in the direction of Ivanovka and three tanks and two APC's were approaching the western edge of Brody.


Execute: As the 1st Tank Platoon commander draw conclusions from the situation, make the decision and formulate it graphically.

KEY: 1. GPZ: 1st Tank Platoon
2. DM [patrol vehicle]

2. Motorized Rifle Platoon in Battle Outposts.

The 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion assumed a defense of the area of Benchmark 56.3, Benchmark 80.0 and two lone trees with the mission of preventing the penetration of "enemy" tanks and infantry in the direction of the pond and road fork.


The 1st MRP of 1st MRC is the battle outpost. It occupies and defends the position Rock 1.5 and spring with the mission of preventing a surprise "enemy" attack on the battalion main body and preventing his performance of ground reconnaissance. The following situation took shape by 0600 hours: An "enemy" APC is advancing in the direction of the 3d Squad position and up to an infantry squad is moving in dismounted formation toward the 2d Squad position. Movement of a mixed column (three tanks and three APC's) in the direction of Zvonkiy Brook has been detected on the road.



Execute: As the platoon commander make the decision for further actions and formulate it graphically.

- KEY:
1. 1st Motorized Rifle Company [MRC] (less 1st Motorized Rifle Platoon [MRP])
 2. 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion
 3. ... MRC
 4. 1st MRP
 5. ... Motorized Rifle Squad
 6. Well
 7. SO [fire concentration] of 1st MRC
 8. Ruins
 9. Zvonkiy Brook

3. Reconnaissance Platoon on a Sweep.



The "enemy" forward edge passes along the south slopes of Hill 50.1, the hill with the dry snag and Oval'naya Hill. His weapons on the forward edge are in conformity with the diagram of the initial situation.

Minefields and barbed-wire entanglements have been placed in front of the forward edge.

In order to monitor approaches to the forward edge at night, the "enemy" is using passive night vision devices and also is illuminating and placing fire on the terrain periodically.


An artillery subunit, mortar battery, combat engineer squad as well as other weapons are being employed to support the platoon's actions in the sweep.

Reference data: Time of year--October; temperature--daytime 10-12°, nighttime 3-4°; there is fog from 0300-0400 hours and until 1000-1100 hours.

Execute: Make the decision to conduct the sweep and formulate it graphically.

Answers to Fourth Series of Problems

1. Tank Platoon in Ambush.




Decision: Set up ambush in Berezovaya Grove. With "enemy's" move into area of lone bushes destroy advancing tanks by surprise fire. Occupy firing positions as follows: Tank No 12 near rocks, Tank No 13 in emplacement, Tank No 14 in crater. Platoon sector of fire is the bushes and road to Lapshino. In case individual "enemy" tanks penetrated to the populated point of Verbovka, hit their sides by fire from the ambush and place machinegun fire on surviving crews.

KEY:

1. North
2. Reference Point ...
3. Sosnovaya
4. Ignatovka
5. Dlinnaya
6. Berezovaya
7. Verbovka
8. 1st MRC

2. Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Attack




Decision: Exploiting success of the neighbor on the left, go around Dlinnaya Hill with two BMP's and destroy the "enemy" on Dlinnaya Hill by a simultaneous attack from the front, flank and rear in coordination with the 1st MRP and 2d MRP and continue the attack in the direction of Temnyy Forest.

KEY:

1. 1st MRC
2. 3d MRP
3. ... MRP
4. ... Squad
5. North
6. Dlinnaya Hill
7. Podkova Hill
8. Redkiy Bushes
9. Temnyy Forest

with two BMP's and 1st and 3d squads and hit him by fire from the rear. At a green flare signal attack the "enemy" on Dlinnaya Hill and destroy him in coordination with 1st and 2d squads. Readiness for the attack is 1245 hours.

3. Reconnaissance Platoon in Ambush.



KEY:

1. ORD [separate reconnaissance patrol]
2. Patrol vehicle
3. North
4. Kamennyy Quarry
5. Yuzhnyy Forest
6. Pestrovo
7. Svetlaya River
8. Dubrava Forest
9. Figurnaya Grove

Decision: Set up ambush on southern edge of Dubrava Forest. Attack the "enemy" APC when it reaches Kamennyy Quarry, since in this case its capability of maneuver will be limited.

Assign the BMP crew to the attack group and place it in the center of the ambush. The tanks are on the right flank of the ambush, which will permit covering the platoon from the west and at the same time reliably hitting the attack objective.

My place is in the BMP located on the left flank of the ambush, from which it is more advantageous to control the groups for fire support and attack, and the patrol vehicle.

The patrol vehicle is to move up to the southern edge of Figurnaya Grove and organize surveillance in the direction of Pestrovo.

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CSO: 1801/237

AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIR DEFENSE FORCES DAY: MATERIAL FOR TALKS AND REPORTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 82 (signed to press 18 Feb 82) pp 25-30

[Article: "Protecting the Sky of the Motherland"]

[Excerpts] An annual holiday, Air Defense Forces Day, has been established by the Ukaze of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 20 February 1975. It has become traditional since then. It has also become a traditional rule for the personnel of the Forces to greet their holiday with high indices in the accomplishment of their assigned tasks, in improving combat skill, and in strengthening organization and discipline.

This year, preparations for the celebration are taking place in an environment of exceptionally high political enthusiasm and the labor enthusiasm of the Soviet people. Inspired by the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and implementing the program for communist construction, they have initiated socialist competition for the successful accomplishment of the tasks for the five-year plan and are pleasing the fatherland with high indices in labor.

The Soviet people must work with inspiration, creatively, and with full exertion of strength in an extremely difficult international situation. The NATO countries, led by the United States, are trying by every means to undermine the growing influence of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist commonwealth in the world arena, to attain military superiority over them, and to intensify confrontation with the USSR. In this, the ruling circles of the United States are placing main reliance on increasing their offensive combat power and are speeding up the arms race.

Nor can we fail to be alarmed by the fact that under Washington's pressure the NATO leaders are trying to place American medium-range missiles in Western Europe in addition to the means of attack which are already present. The decision of the U.S. administration to begin full-scale production of neutron weapons is a call to all mankind. All this leads to an increase in the threat to peace.

Adventurism and a readiness to stake the vital interests of mankind in the name of their narrow, mercenary interests, it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, are being manifested especially nakedly in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles today.

The alarming development of events in the world is being aggravated by the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership. This policy is directed toward aggravating the international situation and fits in with the policy of imperialism.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are adopting all measures to achieve a relaxation of tension and ensure peace on earth. In its foreign policy, it was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union intends to seek patiently and consistently ever newer and newer ways to develop mutually advantageous collaboration of states with different social systems and ways to disarmament.

The readiness to begin immediate talks on the limitation and reduction of armaments was declared once again in the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, "To the parliaments and peoples of the world," which was adopted at its 5th session, 10th convocation, in June of last year.

This thought was especially stressed also in the replies of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the American NBC Television Company. "The Soviet Union also regards positively the efforts of any country--large, medium, or small--if these efforts are directed toward improving the political climate and lowering the level of military opposition," said Leonid Il'ich. "We ourselves are doing and are ready to do much in this direction. And there should be no doubt that corresponding actions by the United States or any other state will find understanding and a response with us. No one's hand which is extended toward us to be shaken will hang poised in mid air."

At the same time, our party considers it its sacred duty to ensure the proper level of the country's defensive capability. As was indicated at the 26th Party Congress, the international situation obliges us to do this. The high combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces was and remains an important factor in restraining imperialist aspirations for world domination. The Armed Forces have available everything necessary to give a decisive rebuff to any aggression from wherever it may originate.

Profoundly realizing their patriotic and international duty, the Soviet servicemen are constantly strengthening the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

To maintain the highest combat readiness from day to day, hourly, and every minute is a long-standing and one of the most important traditions of the Air Defense Forces. Its roots extend back to those distant years when the air defense created on the initiative of V. I. Lenin repelled enemy air attacks on Petrograd, Moscow, Tula, Baku, and other cities which found themselves in its zone of operations.

[Portion not translated pertains to history of the Air Defense Forces from April 1918 through the end of World War II]

An important means for mobilizing the air defense [AD] men for the successful accomplishment of their assigned missions, strengthening the morale of the personnel, instilling in the personnel bravery and steadfastness, and their ideological tempering was party-political work which was conducted purposefully in the units and sub-units under any conditions and in any situation. With consideration of the specific nature of AD combat operations, the diversity of its men and equipment, and the uniqueness of the disposition of units and subunits commanders and political officers as well as party and Komsomol organizations achieved by all measures the situation

where each fighting man mastered the goals and nature of war and the missions facing him bravely, accomplished his duty with all responsibility, and displayed high combat activity.

A large role in instilling bravery and valor and the ability to overcome the difficulties of life at the front in the young fighters and in rallying the military collectives belonged to the communists. They conducted active explanatory work among their comrades and fellow servicemen, sharing the joy of victory and the bitter taste of failures with them and, by personal example, they showed how to fight with the enemy and were the first to go to accomplish the most difficult missions, carrying the others along behind them.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War formed the basis for the intensive improvement of the Air Defense Forces even after its conclusion. In conducting a policy of struggle for peace, the Communist Party and the Soviet government displayed untiring concern for raising the defensive capability of our socialist state and the combat might of the Armed Forces, including the Air Defense Forces. The international situation, which was characterized by intensified hostile propaganda against the USSR which was actively conducted by the imperialist states, was strictly considered. They openly called for war against the first socialist state in the world. The means of air attack were intensively improved in the capitalist countries. Military bases and bridgeheads were created around the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. All this, of course, could not fail to cause concern, and forced the adoption of decisive measures in order to strengthen the air defense of the Soviet state in every possible way. The capabilities of the means of air attack in the most developed capitalist countries were considered here. New AD means were created and the system for its structuring was improved, which permitted successive influence on the enemy with the buildup of efforts through the entire depth of his probable penetration.

The development and improvement of the Air Defense Forces occurred together with the growth in the country's economic might and the strengthening of its Armed Forces. The Communist Party displayed untiring concern for the technical equipping of all the services of the Armed Forces, including the Air Defense Forces, and persistently saw that the personnel have in their hands the most modern types of weapons and equipment.

In the 1950's, AD fighter aviation was reequipped with jet fighter aircraft; anti-aircraft artillery was equipped with new antiaircraft artillery complexes. The VNOS [aircraft warning service] troops received radar equipment in their inventory and began to be called the radio troops.

Substantial organizational changes also occurred at this time. The National Air Defense Forces became an independent service of the Soviet Armed Forces. They are now equipped with everything necessary for the successful accomplishment of missions connected with the timely detection of aerial attack and the destruction of existing and future targets at various altitudes, in any weather, with strong enemy electronic countermeasures, and at distant approaches to the defended objectives. The organizational structure of the air defense permits the successful conduct of combat operations with the close coordination of all combat arms--surface-to-air missile, AD aviation, and radio troops.

The surface-to-air missile troops possess great firepower and high accuracy in firing at aerial targets. They are armed with contemporary surface-to-air missile complexes which are capable of reliably destroying any enemy means of attack in the entire range of their flight altitudes and speeds and at great distances from the defended objectives regardless of weather conditions and the time of day.

Air defense aviation is the most maneuverable combat arm which is intended for repelling an air attack primarily at the distant approaches to the covered objectives. It is armed with supersonic all-weather interceptor fighters with powerful rocket weapons which are capable of attacking and destroying targets within a broad range of altitudes, under any weather conditions, and at any time of the day.

The AD radio troops accomplish important missions connected with continuous radar reconnaissance of the means of aerial attack in flight and putting out information about them which is necessary to control the combat operations of the surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation.

A typical feature of the Air Defense Forces is the broad use of electronic equipment and automated systems in all elements, which reduces considerably the times for putting the weapons into action and raises the effectiveness of their employment.

With such technical equipping, a special role belongs to the professional training of people who control the weapons, machines, instruments, and mechanisms, and to their organization and discipline. Therefore, commanders, political officers, and Party and Komsomol organizations display constant concern that each man knows the weapons and equipment entrusted to him to perfection, keeps them in exemplary condition, and is able to control them in a most difficult situation and adopt correct decisions. In organizing a persistent struggle for a high level of each lesson and each drill so that they equip the men with knowledge and experience to the maximum, commanders, political officers, and organizational and ad hoc propagandists constantly explain to the personnel the requirement of the 26th Party Congress--to be in constant and high combat readiness.

The Air Defense Forces, just as all the Soviet Armed Forces, have an excellent understanding of the important missions which have been assigned to them and give all their strength to the assigned matter. The results of the last training year and the first months of this one permit drawing the conclusion that the personnel of the Air Defense Forces are moving confidently from position to position in combat improvement and are persistently achieving ever newer successes in socialist competition.

The personnel of the surface-to-air AD regiment commanded by Colonel V. Parshikov stepped forth last year as the initiator of socialist competition in the Air Defense Forces. The soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers [praporshchik], and officers of the regiment, inspired by the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, labored intensely and fruitfully, successfully accomplished the missions assigned to them and their socialist obligations, and achieved a further rise in combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline.

The regiment's personnel again stepped forth with the patriotic initiative to initiate socialist competition in the Air Defense Forces for a worthy greeting for the

60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and the quality accomplishment of the missions assigned by the Soviet Minister of Defense for the 1982 training year. It has become a rule for the men of the regiment: capturing one position, to pose newer and higher tasks for themselves, increase successes in socialist competition, use training time with care, and give all their strength to the mastery of equipment, the improvement of combat skill, and the struggle for economy and thrift.

The regiment's initiative received broad support in the Air Defense Forces. Following its example, all collectives joined in the socialist competition. Now many of them gladden the motherland with remarkable achievements in the accomplishment of the most important tasks.

The personnel of the Nth Guards twice order-bearing fighter aviation unit enjoy good fame. It has glorious combat traditions. During the years of the Great Patriotic War 26 of its valiant pilots were awarded the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union and hundreds of aerial fighters were awarded orders and medals. Now officers, warrant officers, and soldiers are justifying by deeds the confidence shown in them to serve in the famous unit, are multiplying the glorious traditions, and accomplishing their assigned missions successfully. Participating actively in socialist competition under the slogan, "Reliable defense for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" they are improving combat ability and learning to destroy the enemy with the first attack, with the first rocket launch.

To learn to live and accomplish their military duty in the Lenin manner, in the communist manner, to be in constant readiness for the accomplishment of combat missions, to perform combat duty in guarding the aerial borders of the motherland vigilantly and with high grades, to reduce the times to prepare the equipment and weapons for action, to accomplish all training missions with grades of "excellent" and "good," to conduct tactical exercises with live firing with a grade of "excellent"--these are the obligations of the men of many units and subunits. The personnel of the troops initiated a struggle to increase the coordination of the sections, subunits, and organs of combat control, to study and introduce leading experience, for the high quality of prescribed maintenance work, and for competition for the title of best specialist of the battery, battalion, and regiment. Universities of technical knowledge, lecture bureaus, and technical study groups are operating actively among the troops and military-technical conferences and the exchange of leading experience in the employment and maintenance of equipment and armament are organized. All this permits the men to improve their professional knowledge and skills effectively.

The fact that the personnel of the Air Defense Forces are successfully mastering the difficult equipment entrusted to them and are able to utilize its capabilities completely and accomplish missions under any conditions was shown by the exercises "Zapad [West]-81." The air defense men showed themselves to be bold, decisive, and ideologically tempered defenders of the motherland on them.

Service in the Air Defense Forces is difficult and important. It requires high moral, physical, and psychological preparedness of each officer, warrant officer, and soldier. These qualities, as is known, do not come automatically but are molded in the course of combat and political training and active and purposeful ideological work. Commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations are devoting great attention to the ideological tempering of the personnel, indoctrinating

the men in the spirit of the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress, constantly improving the forms and methods of ideological and political indoctrinational work with the men, and achieving its high effectiveness. Each measure should leave a noticeable trace in the consciousness of the officer, warrant officer, sergeant, and soldier and should stimulate in him the striving to perform his duty in the best way possible, and give all his strength to the assigned matter--the organizers of party-political and ideological work proceed from this. In carrying out the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee's decree, "On further improvement of ideological and political indoctrinational work," they have expanded significantly the subject matter of lectures and reports and are achieving an increase in their ideological content and the strengthening of the tie with life, combat training, and the tasks being accomplished by the men.

Considerable influence is exerted on raising the effectiveness of ideological and political indoctrinational work by the participation of the leader personnel in it and by the purposeful and active work of agitation-propaganda collectives and agitation-propaganda groups and the constantly strengthening ties with local party and soviet organs, enterprises, and institutions.

The political training of the warrant officers and political lessons with sergeants and soldiers are being organized on a high level, and the forms of propaganda of the glorious traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Air Defense Forces, and of each unit, of the successes of communist construction in our country, and of the labor exploits of the Soviet people who are carrying out the plans for the new five-year plan outlined by the party have become more varied.

All this, naturally, contributes to the fact that each serviceman is successfully generating within himself lofty combat-moral qualities and the striving to observe strictly the standards of communist morals, treasure the honor of his collective, strengthen friendship and military comradeship, and struggle for military order as called for by the regulations and for a careful attitude toward equipment, weapons, and other material valuables.

The air defense men of the fraternal socialist countries are standing shoulder to shoulder with the defenders of the Soviet sky. One of the basic directions of their collaboration is joint measures and the exchange of experience in combat training, the working out and introduction of advanced methods of training and indoctrination into practice, and joint exercises on which the skill of commanders and staffs, missilemen, pilots, and radar operators is perfected and cooperation in the accomplishment of missions is strengthened.

In implementing the gigantic program of economic and social development outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress, our party is moving forward filled with faith in a beautiful future. It has a powerful economic and scientific-technical potential and highly-qualified, ideologically tempered personnel. Our Soviet society is distinguished by a healthy moral atmosphere and social optimism and the striving to make the highest contribution to communist construction. This serves as a mighty source of inspiration for the Soviet servicemen.

In marking their traditional holiday--Air Defense Forces Day--the personnel of the Air Defense Forces are standing vigilant guard over the peaceful labor of their people--the builders of communism, and are filled with resolve to attain newer and newer successes in the accomplishment of their assigned missions.

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STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

DUTY IN SRF DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 8, Apr 82 (signed to press 26 Mar 82) pp 10-14

[Article by Col N. Stasenko, Lt Col N. Chevel'cha, and Capt 2d Rank L. Yakutin (photo), special correspondents of SOVETSKIY VOIN: "Strategic Rocket Forces on Combat Watch"]

[Text] We have not ever met more hospitable and, speaking plainly, more human individuals than our hosts at the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). At a leading SRF unit we were shown awards received by its personnel for achievements in combat training and political training. These achievements are inspiring, particularly when one bears in mind the very nature of the difficult service of these troops which in peacetime are carrying out the combat task of protecting our homeland--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

But the deepest impression on us was produced by individuals--SRF members. It is about them that we are writing on the pages of this journal--about these modest, charming, courageous, and competent individuals who are devoted to the nation and ready to do their duty with honor.

Nineteen Shock Decades

The closer the Komsomol Forum [Congress] is approaching, the more frequently are the questions asked: How is the socialist labor competition among Komsomol members proceeding? How are you welcoming the congress? Report on instances of heroism elevating the prosaic....

The questions are not idle at all: it is time to sum up the first results, to share experience with comrades from other units and subdivisions, and to do so, of course, eloquently so as to fire others with enthusiasm.

Igor' Bazilevskiy, secretary of the Komsomol committee at the unit with excellent rating, racked his brains: what to say about the manner in which their initiative, "Donate 19 decades of military shock labor to our native Lenin's party--the 19th Komsomol Congress," is being translated into reality. That initiative was conceived during discussion of the resolutions of the 9th Plenum of the Komsomol CC. Some one conceived the idea and it was taken up, discussed, voted upon.... Now you report, secretary!

But what is there to be reported about? The activities of the Komsomol members proceed as usual. At lessons and exercises they receive A and B grades, and hardly ever a C grade. Their combat watch is fully organized. But all this is ordinary, routine. Where is it, that heroism of prosaic days?

One after another, pictures from the life of SRF men surface in memory.

...It was getting toward the evening. The gray twilight rapidly grew darker, and observation at the post became increasingly difficult. Guards Jr Sgt Valentin Dunayev increasingly often looked through the eyepieces of high-power binoculars. At such moments the densely snow-covered bushes and trees spread apart, as it were.

Suddenly it seemed to him that a shadow flitted in the distance. He riveted his gaze on the suspicious spot. Five minutes passed... then ten. Stillness. Calm. And only the crows noisily nestle in the treetops for their night's sleep. Or do they?...Might not they have been frightened by someone? Valentin was all attention.

The shadow moved again and stealthily advanced toward the forest. The Guards Jr Sgt concluded that a person was moving toward the observation post area and immediately took every step to detain the uninvited guest.

So now the violator stands facing the troops, clumsily shifting his stance from one leg to the other. He awaits his fate.

"Allow me?"

"Come in, comrade Morgay."

The flow of the committee secretary's thoughts is interrupted by a nearly two meters tall giant bearing the shoulder-straps of a jr sgt.

"This is about Komsomol recommendations for our boys, for those who are about to enroll in the party."

"Enter, not enroll, Anatoliy. One enrolls at a school or an institute."

"Well, I'm just a village boy."

Oh, the sly one. He plays a simpleton. In a year of service he advanced to the rank of senior electrician and detachment commander. He has been admitted to candidate membership in the party. Owing to him the detachment has received an excellent rating. He treats the young soldiers as if they were his younger brothers. Timshin, Sergey, ..., Kratyuk, Igor'.... Now they are aces! But not so long ago they had looked like scared blind kittens. Morgay knows how to work with people! He does! Now he is worried about obtaining recommendations for his comrades.

"Well, comrade Guards Lieutenant?"

"It'll be handled routinely. We shall look into it. They are no flash in the pan, are they?"

The giant jumps to his feet: "I vouch for them as I would vouch for myself!"

...Or should something be written about Sasha Teslenko and Kolya Zabolot'ko? True, by now they are candidate members of the party, while at that time they still had been Komsomol members. As a matter of fact, even now they remain in the Komsomol.

What a time it was! Igor' Bazilevskiy remembers how panicked the doctors were. The victims of a car accident were brought to a hospital--civilians, not armed forces personnel. They were at the verge of dying owing to loss of blood. They may have been the parents of these soldiers.

Teslenko and Zabolot'ko were the first to roll up their sleeves, saying: "Take our SRF blood! The healthiest and strongest!" Following their example, the entire sub-unit donated blood.

The commander announced: "Tomorrow we leave for a major exercise." The drivers at once left for the parking area to ready their vehicles. Though the readying was hardly needed since these vehicles are always ready anyway. Consider that each day drivers check and troubleshoot them. They turn on the ignition, listen to the engine noise, test the brakes once or twice, and everything is in order!

Only Grigoriy Kosheleko's vehicle was not in order. "The second cylinder is knocking. Has to be disassembled. Otherwise there may be a breakdown enroute...." The commander asked, frowning: "You realize what this means? A sleepless night!" "Fine!" Kosheleko answers, "Let me go ahead."

"An inlet-valve spring turned out to be broken....What a time it picked to break!" So thought Grigoriy and picked up his tool-box. He was immediately joined by some volunteer assistants.

When Grigoriy and his assistants had returned, it was far past midnight. Under the night-lights the boys were sleeping in the barracks. Suddenly from one corner someone was heard asking, "Well, how did it go?" The answer, from another corner, came: "He made it!" The barracks became a bedlam.... But within 15 minutes afterward everyone was sleeping the sleep of the just, feeling tranquil about their Komsomol driver and about the whole transport sub-unit. After all, the exercise was on for tomorrow!

One after another, the images [pass through Bazilevskiy's mind], and they all seem fit to recount. Take for example Guards Sgt Anosov, assistant supervisor of

the political curriculum group, who in six months had taught his students so well that even those who had problems with the Russian language are now straight A students. How can this be written about when it is ordinary. It is part of service. It is duty. It is conscience, finally, a Komsomol conscience. But one needs to write about something heroic! Where to find it?

When Even Seconds Count

Guards Capt Vafa Maminov had barely sat down at the control panel when the signal "Battle Stations!" had been received.

"Ready, Vladislav Andreyevich?" Without turning his head he silently asked his "Number Two," Guards Lt Neshin.

Neshin answered, "Ready for combat, comrade 'Number One'!" His fingers deftly traveled over switches and keys.

Somewhere in the back the system was mightily and menacingly wheezing. Its measured breathing could not, of course, be heard by the officers, separated as they were from it by a thick concrete wall, but at that instant they routinely remembered every sound in its habitat, and judged from the pitch, timbre, and chords of these sounds that their ward was in excellent health. Otherwise, what would have been the sense of that hours-long watch here with every cell of one's body being tensed to the utmost, with the heart beating loudly in one's chest, the blood coursing through the veins, and the whole body flushing with heat from head to feet whenever an extraneous sound is heard--no dissonance is possible or rather permissible here.

During a combat watch, when the "numbers" not only watch out for the combat signal but also exert all their technical mastery and abilities to ensure the viability of their rocket or system, in terms of the phraseology employed here, during those extremely tense months of check-ups of various elements and components, they have developed the habit of believing--devotedly believing in the unconditional reliability of the system and in the absolutely faultless nature of their own labor.

Thorough familiarity with the laws of physics governing the equipment and its component down to the tiniest screw, plus habits that have become automatic--such is the objective necessity without which there are not and cannot be rocketry troops. Because there is no crime more grave to the Homeland, to the nation, and to one's own conscience, than a delay in fulfilling a combat order, and the more so the failure to fulfill it. It is precisely this steely and totally unshakable confidence that, at the appointed instant, a rocket will be launched toward a target and irreversibly strike it, that is the principal deterrent to aggression. The words of the old folk song, "Leave us alone and we'll leave you alone, but just try and touch us and we'll not let go of you!" apply with a special force to the combat watch of the strategic rocket forces.

His cogitation did not distract Maminov from his work but rather, on the contrary, imbued his conventional manipulations of instruments with a special meaning. From the corner of his eye he noticed that Neshin was fixedly watching the dial of a con-

trol instrument... The Guards Capt's sharp eyes perceived even at a distance a slight shudder of the illuminated pointer.

"Number Two, report your observation!"

"I believe there's no reason for alarm. It may be that the contacts sparked over. This will be cleaned up during preventive maintenance."

Maminov is highly trained in his field, and Neshin as yet has second-class qualifications, though by now he is ready to qualify for first-class exams. But the commander by now has confidence in the experience of his engineer. Joint combat watch rapidly brings people together. The subordinate wholly gave priority to his commander, but at the same time he has more than once noticed the Guards Captain's glances directed at his badge of USSR Sports Master in Heavy Athletics (Maminov himself is a certified category-1 skier). Clearly, such differences in personal qualities are simply necessary for the growth of mutual respect, without which there is no psychological compatibility.

Barely had Guards Captain Maminov thought to himself, "That's good, Vladik, that you're calm. Very good...", when he heard the shrill sound of a warning signal about the failure of an auxiliary mechanism. The sensitive nerves of electronic gear perceived what man could not perceive.

Maminov jumped up and froze for an instant, trying to figure out what happened. The siren hurt ears and chilled blood. It seemed as if one's heart would tear itself out of his chest. This was that "zero instant" about which he had warned the Guards lieutenant more than once during exercises: even before his brain became aware of the signal, his hands did all that was needed. The final part of the operation was performed together by both "numbers."

What happened in essence was that a thermocouple serving to heat the lubricant ended its operating life--its replacement had been planned during the next period of preventive maintenance. The problem had already been envisaged, and it was a bagatelle to debug it. But during a combat watch nothing is a bagatelle. Having calmed down, Guards Lt Neshin smiled his nice smile and said:

"Here even the flitting-by of a fly could give us a shock."

The Guards Capt, thinking of something else, answered: "We Russians like to be thorough in everything. Every cell in our organism is tensed during the performance of our duties...."

Apparently, he continued his self-analysis. Neshin mentally repeated the phrase "We Russians...", uttered by the commander who is a Tatar by nationality--a phrase uttered simply and naturally, and his brown eyes shone. And indeed, all have long since become blood brothers, the sons of a single mother--the Homeland--Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, Georgians.... Each speaks with a different accent, each receives letters smelling of a different part of the country--of Daurian winds, Caucasian snows, or the grasses of the endless Kazakh steppe. Each has his own home, but all have a common Homeland! The Soviet Homeland!

Maminov looked at his watch: the signal had sounded at exactly such and such a time. It seemed to him that the mechanism of the watch was still: the second hand had executed only one-fourth of its circle. The Guards capt wondered: "How short it was!"

A new order was received from the command post and the men plunged into combat work. The malfunction had occurred just before dawn.

The Guards capt got up and paced the room, stretching his stiffened muscles. A telephone rang. A gay voice sounded: "You got a mountain of gifts. Pick them up!"

Some time afterward, they both bit with gusto into a cake baked by their wives, Natasha and Tanya, inseparable friends and superb cooks. Both women had enclosed letters. Vafa Mukhamedovich [Maminov] tore open the bag of a favorite candy sent by his four-year-old daughter Olechka and offered it to his neighbor. Vladislav Neshin, without concealing his envy, muttered: "My Andreyka too will send me something next time. No matter that he's only seven months old. He's developing so rapidly...." Maminov silently traced with a red marker pen the outline of a palm-print of his one and one-half-year-old son Aleshka on the reverse side of his wife's letter....

The Rocketry Troops Have One "Weakness"

It is a byword that military personnel always, speaking figuratively, hold a rifle in one hand and a trowel in the other even under the conditions of greatest hardship--in the mountains, forests, or deserts. And they alone know best how difficult it is to procure scarce materials and find time for construction despite a stringent training curriculum. Yet, amazing as it seems, wherever military personnel settle down, modern cities and settlements mushroom as if touched by a magic wand!

The unit commander, on showing us the beautiful military settlement, observed: "At first there was nothing here, just bare soil." No comments were needed, as the saying goes. Why conceal it--it takes time to properly appreciate the heroism and unquenchable enthusiasm of the builders. The imposing training and material facilities with their electronic and cybernetic gear obscure, of course, the modest five-story residential buildings. But once you are familiar with the concerns of the housing commission, whose discussions deal no longer with the problem of finding an apartment for the family of an officer or ensign but with the problem of providing apartments with amenities, once you visit the cozy clubrooms, the well-endowed libraries, and once you listen to the amateur art concerts, you clearly perceive that superior standing a combat watch is just one of the many skills of the missilemen....

While riding in a "Rafik" through the settlement, now and then we stopped to look at beautiful panels and display stands adorning the streets and alleys. The talented amateur artists graphically depicted on them the 11th Five-Year Plan in action.

The commander stressed: "To us rocket troops these figures and diagrams have a special meaning. Every soldier beholds the Homeland in its entire grandeur of

communist construction... He beholds this graphically presented wealth which we protect and defend by our military toil--all that in whose name we maintain an ever vigilant combat readiness, second after second. At the same time, these figures are not abstract to us. Look, for example, at that graphic display of our own Five-Year Plan. See how many dwelling units, schools, and children's institutions we shall build, how much we shall improve our lives. See our pledges to develop subsidiary farms, especially farming in the kitchen areas. Even now a solid one-third of all fresh meat, milk, and vegetables provided to our troops derives from our own farming. Believe me, this makes for a substantial contribution to the nation's economy! Especially when all our troops are considered. The financial savings thus achieved are utilized for the good of all. See what an infirmary we have built. It rivals those in the nation's capital. And how much building we have done for children!

This manly military man suddenly changes his tone--his voice takes on feeling and warmth: "Children are our weakness. All that's best is for them! I myself have two. True, they're already grown up. See these kindergartens. They are equipped with the most up-to-date facilities, airy, bright, spacious, warm. The children have experienced teachers, selected from among the best educators, and are provided with sound nutrition, toys, books, music. And of course with all that accustoms little people to work. Note the colors of the buildings, which make for a good mood. We had long discussed this matter with designers and finally we found that a light-tan color combined with a light-gray finish is most pleasing to us. Now this is the color of the entire settlement, including its military facilities. We're building a spacious new school in a scenic and airy area where the greenery is most extensive...."

Ivan Ivanovich described in just as much detail and with just as much interest what is done for the older children. They belong to amateur radio, model-building, and sports clubs, as well as to clubs concerned with whatever attracts bold young minds and restless natures, where their activities are guided by corresponding experts from among the missilemen. The older schoolchildren participate in specially designed war games and marches and study the heroic past of our Homeland. It is hardly surprising that the graduates of the settlement's schools enter, as a rule, military higher schools, following the path of their fathers.

We did not overlook either such seemingly not very remarkable creations as the colorful merry-go-rounds, swings, and slides. It may seem nothing special, but the children were always together and under adult supervision, thus making it easier to organize their recreation.

Rockets and children. A surprising combination, to be sure. But nevertheless it does exist! This is possible solely when this mighty handiwork of human reason saves the world from disaster instead of threatening it with disaster. Children are our future--they are the symbol of earthly existence. Thus this "weakness" becomes a strength and an affirmation of life--that in whose name our party struggles for peace on earth.

The guards rocket troops live together in amity. They have inherited the combat glory of the front fighters of an order-bearing arm of service awarded the honorific ["Guards" as in a Guards regiment] for its feats of valor during the Great Patriotic War. The personnel, mostly Komsomol members, celebrates the 19th Komsomol Congress among the right-flank Strategic Rocket Service troops. Still to come is a glorious anniversary--the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR. Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, Tatars, and Armenians--they all live for a common goal, that of welcoming this great holiday of our multi-national Homeland with new achievements in combat training and political training, with vigilant service to the state through a faultless standing of the combat watch.

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